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Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas
for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s
Wake
Amy J. Sepinwall†
In the paradigmatic case of conscientious objection, the objector claims that
his religion forbids him from actively participating in a wrong (for example, by
fighting in a war). In the religious challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s employer
mandate, on the other hand, employers claim that their religious convictions forbid
them from merely subsidizing insurance through which their employees might
commit a wrong (for example, by using contraception). The understanding of complicity underpinning these challenges is vastly more expansive than the standard
that legal doctrine or moral theory contemplates. Courts routinely reject claims of
conscientious objection to taxes that fund military initiatives or to university fees
that support abortion services. In Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court took
the corporate owners at their word: the mere fact that Hobby Lobby believed that it
would be complicit, no matter how idiosyncratic its belief, sufficed to qualify it for
an exemption. In this way, the Court made elements of an employee’s health-care
package the “boss’s business” (to borrow from the nickname of the Democrats’ proposed bill to overturn Hobby Lobby).
Much of the critical reaction to Hobby Lobby focuses on the issue of corporate
rights of religious freedom. Yet this issue is a red herring. The deeper concerns that
Hobby Lobby raises—about whether employers may now refuse, on religious
grounds, to subsidize other forms of health coverage (for example, blood transfusions or vaccinations) or to serve customers whose lifestyles they deplore (for example, gays and lesbians)—do not turn on the organizational form that the employer
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has adopted. Instead, the more significant issue goes to our understanding of complicity: When is it reasonable for an employer (for-profit or nonprofit, corporate or
individual) to think itself complicit in the conduct of its employees or customers?
And when is a reasonable claim of complicity compelling enough to warrant an
accommodation, especially when that accommodation would impose costs on third
parties?
Hobby Lobby does not provide the proper guidance for answering these questions, and no wonder: as I argue here, the concept of complicity pervading the
treatment of conscientious objection in the law is murky and misleading, and it
often yields unjust results. This Article offers the guidance that the doctrine does
not. To that end, it exposes the flaws in the understandings of complicity evident in
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hobby Lobby, as well as in Religious
Freedom Restoration Act cases more generally. It then seeks to disaggregate the elements of a complicity claim and to identify which of these elements deserves to be
treated deferentially.
Deference, however, is not decisive. The Article’s second ambition is to expose
an oversight in the law’s treatment of conscientious objection—namely, its failure
to inquire into how a religious accommodation will affect third parties. Exemption
opponents contend that the law already requires courts to deny an accommodation
when the accommodation would impose substantial burdens on third parties. I believe that these opponents have a mistaken and overly sanguine view of the protection that the doctrine currently affords. I end the Article by proposing a revised
balancing test—one that reflects a far more nuanced grasp of what is at stake for
the objector while yielding far more just outcomes for third parties.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1899
I. COMPLICITY AND DEFERENCE .................................................................... 1911
A. Moral, Empirical, and Relational Elements of Complicity Claims . 1911
B. Complicity as Intentional Participation........................................... 1913
1. Decisionmaking and complicity................................................. 1915
2. Complicity as direct participation. ............................................ 1918
C. Complicity as Subjective Implication ............................................... 1922
D. Deference to Nonstandard Beliefs .................................................... 1923
1. Moral deference.......................................................................... 1927
2. Empirical deference. .................................................................. 1930
3. Relational deference. ................................................................. 1934
II. COMPLICITY IN LAW AND ETHICS ................................................................ 1938
III. THE TROUBLING ROLE OF PROXIMITY IN COMPLICITY DETERMINATIONS .... 1944
A. Proximity as the Prevailing Criterion for Conscientious Objection 1945
B. The Grounds of Conscientious Objection ......................................... 1948
C. Proximity versus First Person Perceptions of Complicity............... 1951
D. Morally Mandated Indifference to Proximity .................................. 1958
IV. MISSING THIRD PARTIES: A TROUBLING OVERSIGHT .................................. 1959
A. The Hobby Lobby Dissent’s Strained Efforts to Find Third-Party
Considerations in the Doctrine......................................................... 1961
B. The Troubling Omission of Third-Party Costs ................................ 1966

03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Conscience and Complicity

12/12/2015 2:32 PM

1899

1.
2.
3.

The compelling-interest prong of RFRA. .................................. 1967
The Establishment Clause. ....................................................... 1967
The “shoals” causing claims for religious accommodation to
founder. ...................................................................................... 1970
4. Third-party intervention. .......................................................... 1972
C. Balancing Concerns for Complicity against Third-Party Costs ...... 1973
1. Assessing the strength of complicity claims. ............................ 1973
2. Balancing deference against third-party interests................... 1974
3. Bringing third-party interests before a court. .......................... 1976
D. Assessing Hobby Lobby and Its Progeny in Light of the Proposed
Balancing Test .................................................................................. 1977
CONCLUSION AND A PERSONAL APOLOGIA ......................................................... 1979

INTRODUCTION
In Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 1 the Supreme Court
faced a plea for an exemption from the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act 2 (ACA) based on an unusually broad conception of complicity: Hobby Lobby, a closely held for-profit corporation, claimed that it would be participating in a wrong merely by
subsidizing insurance through which its employees might access
contraception that might destroy embryos. 3 The understanding
of complicity underpinning this claim is vastly more expansive
than that which standard legal doctrine or moral theory
contemplates. 4 As such, the Court could have rejected Hobby
Lobby’s claim—and, in doing so, denied it an exemption from the
so-called contraceptive mandate 5—on the ground that Hobby
Lobby’s connection to the conduct it found objectionable was too
134 S Ct 2751 (2014).
Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
3
See Aaron E. Carroll, How Hobby Lobby Ruling Could Limit Access to Birth Control (NY Times, June 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E2WP-LJTN (describing the
medical consensus that the possibility of the challenged methods of contraception involving embryo destruction is highly speculative and improbable). See also George J. Annas,
Theodore W. Ruger, and Jennifer Prah Ruger, Money, Sex, and Religion — the Supreme
Court’s ACA Sequel, 371 New Eng J Med 862, 862 (2014) (“[I]n the opinion of medical
experts, the four methods of contraception under scrutiny do not induce abortion; rather,
they prevent abortion by preventing pregnancy.”); notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
4
See Part II.
5
See ACA § 1001(5), 124 Stat at 131, codified at 42 USC § 300gg-13(a)(4). I join
Professor Marty Lederman and others in thinking that the term “mandate” is misleading
here. See Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III—There Is No “Employer Mandate”
(Balkinization, Dec 18, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2XLJ-5PEN. See also Micah
Schwartzman, Rich Schragger, and Nelson Tebbe, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment
Clause: Gedicks and the Government (Balkinization, Jan 21, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/6D4J-JDMQ.
1
2
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tenuous to be cognizable. Courts have proceeded in just this way
in countless other cases in which, say, taxpayers have lodged
conscientious objections to subsidizing military spending, 6 or
students have lodged conscientious objections to paying university fees that cover medical services providing abortion counseling. 7 Instead, the Court took Hobby Lobby at its word: the mere
fact that Hobby Lobby believed that it would be complicit, no
matter how idiosyncratic its belief, sufficed to qualify it for an
exemption. 8 In a similar vein, the Court proceeded with grand
deference in an order that it issued just three days after rendering its Hobby Lobby decision. 9 There, the Court acceded to
Wheaton College’s request for a preliminary injunction exempting it not from having to cover its employees’ contraception
6
See, for example, United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens concurring) (“[T]here is virtually no room for a ‘constitutionally required exemption’ on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is entirely neutral in its general application.”);
Michelle O’Connor, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Exactly What Rights Does It
“Restore” in the Federal Tax Context?, 36 Ariz St L J 321, 329 (2004) (“Aside from the licensing tax cases . . . the Supreme Court never has held that the Free Exercise Clause
requires the government to grant a person an exemption from a generally applicable,
neutral tax law.”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For God and Country: Taxing Conscience,
1999 Wis L Rev 939, 971 (surveying cases and concluding that “[e]ach has held that . . .
[the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] . . . does not require the income tax laws to accommodate religious beliefs, specifically those of conscientious objectors to war”). See
also notes 161–62 (collecting cases in which courts have rejected claims of conscientious
objection to taxes aimed at funding initiatives that the taxpayer opposes).
7
See, for example, Goehring v Brophy, 94 F3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir 1996), overruled
on other grounds by City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) (holding that the use of
university registration fees to fund a student health insurance plan that included abortion coverage did not substantially burden the free exercise rights of students who objected to abortion on religious grounds, in part because the “plaintiffs [were] not required
to accept, participate in, or advocate in any manner for the provision of abortion
services”); Erzinger v Regents of University of California, 187 Cal Rptr 164, 166–68 (Cal
App 1982).
8
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778 (noting that federal courts will not address
whether a religious belief asserted in a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) case
is reasonable). Hobby Lobby in fact consolidated two cases involving claims of conscientious objection on the parts of three employers. In the first case, an appeal from the
Tenth Circuit, two closely held corporations owned by the Green family—Hobby Lobby, a
chain of craft stores, and Mardel, a publisher of Christian texts—challenged the contraceptive mandate and won. See generally Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v Sebelius, 723 F3d
1114 (10th Cir 2013). In the second case, an appeal from the Third Circuit, Conestoga
Wood, a closely held corporation owned by the Hahn family that manufactures kitchen
cabinets, also challenged the contraceptive mandate but lost. See generally Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp v Secretary of United States Department of Health and Human
Services, 724 F3d 377 (3d Cir 2013). For ease of exposition, I refer in the text only to
Hobby Lobby, though everything I say about that company applies to Mardel and
Conestoga as well, unless otherwise indicated.
9
See generally Wheaton College v Burwell, 134 S Ct 2806 (2014).
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costs—the government had already released Wheaton from the
contraceptive mandate 10—but from having to fill out the form
that would formalize its exemption. 11 Thus, the mere fact that
Wheaton College believed that filling out the form would make it
complicit in contraceptive coverage was sufficient to qualify it,
too—at least preliminarily—for an exemption. 12
These cases suggest that we have entered an era of unstinting deference to religious belief, often based on fantastical conceptions of complicity exercised at the expense of third parties
who incur a burden in light of an accommodation obtained by
the religious adherent. As Professor Sanford Levinson puts it,
“‘Because this is the way I feel’ seems to be a conclusive

10 The original accommodation procedure required a nonprofit to complete a form
certifying that it is a religious nonprofit that opposes contraception. See 45 CFR
§ 147.131(b)(4). The nonprofit had to then submit that form to its third-party
administrator (TPA), which would then be on notice that it had to provide contraception
in the nonprofit’s stead. See 29 CFR § 2590.715-2713A(a)(b). For the form itself, see
EBSA Form 700— Certification (Aug 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5JX5-8SBD.
In response to the Wheaton College order, the Obama administration revised the accommodation procedure. The new procedure permits a religious nonprofit to register its
objection directly with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) instead of
with its TPA. It is then HHS’s responsibility to notify the TPA. See Department of the
Treasury, Department of Labor, and Department of Health and Human Services, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed Reg 51092,
51094–95 (2014); Department of the Treasury, Department of Labor, and Department of
Health and Human Services, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed Reg 41318, 41323 (2015); 29 CFR § 2590.715-2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B). I
discuss the merits of the challenges to the old and new procedures in note 91.
11 Wheaton College, 134 S Ct at 2807. In a Seventh Circuit case raising an almost
identical challenge, Judge Richard Posner emphasized the “novelty” of the claim at issue
in this pithy way: the plaintiff asked “not for the exemption, which it ha[d], but for the
right to have it without having to ask for it.” University of Notre Dame v Sebelius, 743
F3d 547, 557 (7th Cir 2014).
12 Seven of the eight federal appellate courts to hear appeals in which religious
nonprofits have objected to the filing requirement have rejected the nonprofits’ claims,
stating that it is the ACA itself, and not the filing of the form, that triggers coverage for
contraceptive use. See, for example, Priests for Life v United States Department of Health
and Human Services, 772 F3d 229, 252–53 (DC Cir 2014), cert granted, 2015 WL
6759640 (US). See also Challenges to the Federal Contraceptive Coverage Rule (ACLU,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/24GF-EMFU (providing a list of citations to the decisions addressing religious challenges to the accommodation). In the most recent of these
cases, however, the Eighth Circuit affirmed lower court orders granting injunctive relief
to religious organizations, holding that the organizations deserved to prevail in their
challenges to the accommodation procedures. See Dordt College v Burwell, 2015 WL
5449504, *2 (8th Cir); Sharpe Holdings, Inc v United States Department of Health and
Human Services, 2015 WL 5449491, *13 (8th Cir). In both cases, the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the nonprofits that the filing of the form imposed a substantial burden on
the nonprofits’ religious exercise, and it found that the government’s interest, while
compelling, could be served by a less-restrictive means.
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argument in the religio[us] realm.” 13 Invocations of religion, that
is, threaten to function as trumps, 14 foreclosing legal intervention for everything from discrimination against gays and lesbians to refusals to cover lifesaving care. Hobby Lobby, then,
would have religion reign supreme. 15

13 Sandy Levinson, Justice Ginsburg’s Inexplicable First Two Pages (Balkinization,
June 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/H35H-RX4S.
14 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously xi (Harvard 1977) (“Individual
rights are political trumps held by individuals.”); Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in
Jeremy Waldron, ed, Theories of Rights 153, 153 (Oxford 1984). For a critical reaction to
the conception of rights as trumps, focusing especially on the conception’s atomistic
implications, see, for example, Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in
Search of a Public Philosophy 25–26 (Belknap 1996); Charles Taylor, Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada, in Alan
Cairns and Cynthia Williams, eds, Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada
183, 209 (Toronto 1985) (describing the rights model as identifying “the dignity of the
free agent . . . more with the bearer of rights than with the citizen participator”); Richard
H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J Legal Stud 725, 729 (1998); Robin West, Rights, Harms, and Duties: A
Response to Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 BU L Rev 819, 819 (2010).
15 I focus here largely on religiously based claims of conscientious objection because
Hobby Lobby was decided under a statute protecting religious freedom. See note 20 and
accompanying text (describing RFRA). With that said, I note that conscience can be
informed by religious as well as secular moral convictions, and some scholars argue that
the law should be equally hospitable to both. See, for example, Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent at 55 (cited in note 14); Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 51–77 (Harvard 2007). For arguments on the other
side, see, for example, Chad Flanders, The Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26
Quinnipiac L Rev 257, 301 (2008); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out
Religion, 50 DePaul L Rev 1, 3 (2000). See also United States v Seeger, 380 US 163, 164–
66 (1965) (accommodating nonreligious pacifistic objections to the draft because they
played the same role in their bearers’ lives that religious convictions play for religious
pacifists); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195,
197 (1992) (arguing that each of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
entails protections for religious freedom as well as freedom from religion). For an especially searching inquiry into whether religion is special, see Micah Schwartzman, What
If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U Chi L Rev 1351, 1353 (2012). And for the claim that conscience, whether informed by religious or secular precepts, is both over- and underinclusive
when it comes to identifying the set of legal requirements from which one should be able
to claim an exemption, see Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 Legal Theory 215, 221–24 (2009).
Shortly before this Article went to press, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia became the first court to grant an exemption from the contraceptive
mandate on the basis of secular objections to the coverage of so-called abortifacients. See
March for Life v Burwell, 2015 WL 5139099, *12 (DDC). March for Life is a nonreligious
nonprofit dedicated to advancing pro-life causes. On that basis, the district court found
the organization’s objections no less sincerely or strongly held than those of a religious
nonprofit, and the court found the government’s willingness to accommodate only religious nonprofits but not secular ones a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id at *5–6.
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This unprecedented reverence for religious freedom is the
decision’s key failing and the aspect of the doctrine most in need
of interrogation and rectification. It is appropriate, then, that
the bill that Democrats have proposed to overturn Hobby Lobby
has been given the nickname “Not My Boss’s Business Act.” 16
The central question in Hobby Lobby’s inevitable progeny should
be: “When is a decision about health-care coverage an employer’s
business?” or, more perspicuously, “When does an employer have
a strong-enough reason to think itself complicit in its employees’
health-care choices such that it should enjoy an exemption from
having to subsidize those choices?” And because the Hobby
Lobby decision has implications not just for health-care coverage
but also for antidiscrimination laws—such as when a business
seeks to deny service or employment to gays and lesbians 17—the
question of complicity should be cast more broadly still: “When
may a business owner claim an exemption from a legal requirement that would connect him to conduct that he opposes on religious grounds?” 18 Unfortunately, both the Hobby Lobby decision
and the broader free exercise doctrine provide reason to doubt
that courts will arrive at the right answers going forward.
The doctrine at issue in these cases is based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 19 (RFRA), which allows a
religious adherent to claim an exemption from a neutral law of
general applicability when that law imposes a “substantial burden” on him and the government cannot show that the law aims
to serve a “compelling interest” in the “least restrictive” way
possible. 20 The legal requirement at issue in Hobby Lobby fol-

16 See Protect Women’s Health from Corporate Interference Act of 2014, HR 5051,
113th Cong, 2d Sess (July 9, 2014). See also Jake Lefferman, Dems Strike Back on Hobby
Lobby Case with ‘Not My Boss’s Business Act’ (ABC News, July 9, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/CVA6-QWK2.
17 See, for example, Michael Paulson and Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in
Arizona Cheers Bill Allowing Businesses to Refuse to Serve Gays (NY Times, Feb 21,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E6HD-KZK3.
18 For a survey of some of the issues that might give rise to a clash between claims
to religious freedom and legal protection for historically disfavored lifestyle choices, see
Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, SameSex Marriage, and Other Clashes between Religion and the State, 53 BC L Rev 1417,
1426–29 (2012).
19 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000bb et seq.
20 The precise text of the relevant part of the statute is as follows:

Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance
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lows from the ACA, which imposes an employer mandate:21
businesses employing fifty or more full-time workers must provide health insurance, 22 and this health insurance must include
preventive care for women. 23 Federal rules promulgated in light
of the ACA and developed in consultation with the Institute of
Medicine identify precisely which kinds of preventive care employer health-care packages must offer. Among these is the socalled contraceptive mandate: the rules dictate that all methods
of FDA-approved contraception must be made available through
the health plans offered by large employers. 24 Employers that
object on religious grounds to some or all forms of contraception
have challenged the contraceptive mandate under RFRA, claiming that it imposes a “substantial burden” on their religious exercise. 25 In Hobby Lobby, the Court ruled for the first time that
for-profit corporations can claim rights of religious freedom
under RFRA, and it thus granted Hobby Lobby an exemption
from having to provide the forms of contraception it opposed. 26
Much has been made of the corporate law implications of
the decision. 27 These are important questions in their own right,
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 USC § 2000bb-1(a)–(b). RFRA has been deemed “both a rule of interpretation” and
“an exercise of general legislative supervision over federal agencies, enacted pursuant to
each of the federal powers that gives rise to legislation or agencies in the first place.”
Douglas Laycock and Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 73 Tex L Rev 209, 211 (1994). As such, this “super-statute” can constrain the operation
of any federal legislation that fails RFRA’s test. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 Mont L Rev 249, 253 (1995).
21 See Sandhya Somashekhar, As Health-Care Law’s Employer Mandate Nears,
Firms Cut Worker Hours, Struggle with Logistics (Wash Post, June 23, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/WKK6-GXZM.
22 Other Information about the Health Care Law for Small Businesses (Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services), archived at http://perma.cc/B2JE-AX2J.
23 42 USC § 300gg-13.
24 See 80 Fed Reg at 41318 (cited in note 10).
25 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty maintains a list of the contraceptivemandate challenges. See HHS Mandate Information Central (The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty), archived at http://perma.cc/3A7A-SLH6. As of October 1, 2015, there have
been 105 cases filed, with “victories” (mostly preliminary injunctions) for plaintiffs in 71
of them. See id.
26 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2768, 2784.
27 I address these implications in Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corporation, 5 Harv Bus L
Rev 173 (2015). See also generally Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 Geo Mason L Rev 59 (2013); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood, 100 Va L Rev Online 1 (2014); Eric Orts, The Legal and Social Ontology of the
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but Hobby Lobby’s deeper significance—and the “parade of
horribles” it threatens 28—do not in fact turn on the employer’s
organizational form. 29 This is because the exemptions at issue in
Hobby Lobby and those predicted to be sought in its wake would
be troubling whether it was a corporation, a limited liability
company, a partnership, or a sole proprietorship that was seeking the accommodation. 30 The cause for concern lies not so much
with the extension of RFRA to for-profit entities, then, as with
the doctrine itself, which grants exemptions so long as the religious adherent believes himself to be implicated in the conduct
that his religion opposes, and no matter the costs that an exemption imposes on others. 31
Firm (The Conglomerate, Aug 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8HYG-2N7H; Micah
Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, and Nelson Tebbe, The New Law of Religion (Slate,
July 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/PXN6-996V.
28 Could the Hobby Lobby Ruling Unleash a ‘Parade of Horribles’? (Wharton School,
July 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6PRH-JQGD. In September 2014, a district
court judge relied on Hobby Lobby as precedent to relieve a Mormon from his obligation
to testify in a case alleging that the Church had used child labor. Shadee Ashtari, Judge
Cites Hobby Lobby to Excuse Fundamentalist Mormon from Child Labor Testimony
(Huffington Post, Sept 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7BT7-JRZ9. Commenting
on the case, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky said, “I fear it is just the start of cases of people
claiming religious exemptions from general laws.” Id. See also Douglas NeJaime and
Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and
Politics, 124 Yale L J 2516, 2572–74 (2015) (providing examples of the ways in which
opponents of gay rights have wielded Hobby Lobby to shirk antidiscrimination measures
aimed at protecting gays and lesbians); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv L Rev 933, 947 (1989) (“Behind every
free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge,
and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious
deviants of every stripe.”).
29 For a narrower argument to this effect, see generally Amy Sepinwall, Can a Corporation Have a Conscience? (Wash Post, Mar 21, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/D2WR-9563 (“[T]hose who oppose Hobby Lobby’s stance do so because
they want to ensure that women have adequate access to reproductive health care. They
would object to efforts to circumvent the contraceptive mandate whether it was a corporation or an individual business owner who sought an exemption.”).
30 See generally, for example, Complaint, Wieland v United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Civil Action No 13-01577 (ED Mo filed Aug 14, 2013)
(available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 4618865) (stating the claims made on behalf of individual insurance subscribers objecting to insurance premiums that partly subsidize contraception for other subscribers to the same insurance plan). For a survey of the different
kinds of business forms currently available, see Eric W. Orts, Business Persons: A Legal
Theory of the Firm 175–222 (Oxford 2013).
31 See Korte v Sebelius, 735 F3d 654, 689 (7th Cir 2013) (Rovner dissenting), cert
denied, 134 S Ct 2903 (2014) (noting that the majority’s holding, which exempted two
for-profit businesses from the contraceptive mandate, “has the potential to reach far beyond contraception and to invite employers to seek exemptions from any number of
federally-mandated employee benefits to which an employer might object on religious
grounds”).
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Hobby Lobby and its anticipated progeny fit into a larger
debate about the place of religious freedom in public life, 32 a debate that “continues to divide and trouble the legal system.” 33
But the case and its likely successors also raise distinct questions about the appropriate scope of claims of complicity. In particular, these cases invite us to determine when we ought to
accede to the religious adherent’s belief that abiding by a law of
general applicability makes him complicit in conduct contrary to
his religion. While questions about the general bounds of religious freedom have received ample attention, 34 questions about
complicity remain among the “the most serious and difficult” in
this area because they raise “fundamental questions about the
nature of collective responsibility in a democratic society.” 35
This Article aims to make progress on these questions, engaging with religious objections to legal requirements that compel the adherent to contribute to conduct by others that his
religion opposes. To that end, this Article seeks to diagnose and
then remedy two problems afflicting the doctrine and scholarship around conscientious objection—first, the impoverished understanding of complicity therein, and second, the near neglect
of third-party effects. As to the first problem, the doctrine does
not dictate the scope of cognizable complicity claims: it offers too
little guidance as to when courts should heed a claim that some
legal requirement makes the religious adherent morally responsible for conduct to which the religious adherent objects. One
sees evidence of this problem in the understandings of complicity contained in both the majority opinion and the principal dissent in Hobby Lobby, 36 in the doctrine predating Hobby Lobby,
and in the RFRA scholarship more generally. As we shall see,
courts, as well as scholars, operate with understandings of
As Professor Michael W. McConnell put it, “[D]oes the freedom of religious exercise . . . require the government, in the absence of a sufficiently compelling need, to grant
exemptions from legal duties that conflict with religious obligations? Or does this freedom guarantee only that religious believers will be governed by equal laws, without discrimination or preference?” Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1411 (1990).
33 Id.
34 See generally, for example, Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton
2013); McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev 1409 (cited in note 32); Sullivan, 59 U Chi L Rev 195
(cited in note 15); Koppelman, 15 Legal Theory 215 (cited in note 15).
35 Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 Va L Rev 317, 376 (2011).
36 I focus principally on Justice Samuel Alito’s majority opinion and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s dissent, although I make passing reference to Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
concurrence.
32
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complicity that are murky, undertheorized, and at times just
plain wrong. 37
The doctrine regarding conscientious objection is afflicted by
a second problem as well, as it does not take third-party interests into account except to the extent that they align with the
government’s interest in imposing the legal requirement. As
such, women’s interests in easy access to the full spectrum of the
ACA-approved contraceptive methods are factored into the doctrine’s balancing test only if the government takes these interests to be compelling. 38 So too with gays’ and lesbians’ interests
in equal treatment in the commercial sphere. The dissent was
sensitive to this concern, faulting the majority in large part because the majority accorded an exemption without due regard
for the effect of the exemption on the “thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons
those corporations employ.” 39 But the doctrine does not support
the dissent’s complaint. Instead, the relevant precedents treat
third-party interests as merely tangential to the inquiry about
whether to accommodate the religious believer’s objection to the
legal requirement with which he disagrees. What matters, according to the doctrine, is the government’s interest in the contested regulation. But there is no reason to think that the government’s interest overlaps with the interests of the third
parties who would incur a burden were the religious objector to
receive an exemption. 40 As such, the government is poorly placed
to defend the interests of third parties in the face of a complaint
about governmental infringement of religious freedom. And yet
the doctrine’s failure here has escaped the notice of virtually all
commentators, 41 who contend either that third parties suffer no
See Part III.A–B.
See Part IV.A–B.
39 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Ginsburg dissenting). See also id at 2801 (Ginsburg
dissenting) (“No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based
exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to others—here, the very persons
the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed to protect.”).
40 I provide an example to this effect in Part IV.B.
41 But see Frederick Mark Gedicks and Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why
an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 Vand L Rev
En Banc 51, 65 (2014) (“The most depressing aspect of discussions surrounding the
Hobby Lobby litigation is the total failure to acknowledge the women who would be
harmed by RFRA exemptions from the Mandate.”). Professor Alan E. Garfield does not
fault the doctrine for overlooking women’s interests, but he does contend that the doctrine on religious freedom underdetermines the issues here. Given the indeterminacy,
and assuming that women’s interests are more important than those of the religious objectors, Garfield concludes that the exemption should be denied. Alan E. Garfield, The
37
38
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cognizable harm from an exemption42 or else that the doctrine
really does factor in third-party costs. 43
In short, the question whether contraception (or blood transfusions, or sexual orientation, for that matter) is a “boss’s business” is one that the doctrine is ill equipped to answer, both because it lacks a well-founded theory of complicity and because it
does not adequately consider how the boss’s interests should interact with those of the employees or potential customers whom
the boss’s interests affect. The purpose of this Article is to provide the missing theoretical and doctrinal pieces in a way that
leads to much more justifiable, and just, results. The revised
doctrine at which I arrive comes out in favor of Hobby Lobby,
but it avoids the troubling implications to which the Hobby
Lobby decision could give rise, if unchecked.
More specifically, I argue that we should treat complicity
claims with great deference: I hope to show that we are, in many
cases, without the moral clarity or authority to challenge someone’s belief that the conduct legally required of him would make
him complicit in what he perceives as a wrong. Yet if we are restricted in challenging the truth of his assertion of complicity,
then it becomes especially important to be able to assess his objection on the basis of the cost that honoring it would impose on
others. Thus, I contend that the smaller the burden of a religious exemption on third parties, the more readily courts should
grant the requested exemption. By the same token, the greater
the burden that a conscience-based exemption would impose on
third parties, the less willing courts should be to accede to the

Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 Colum L Rev Sidebar
1, 22–23 (2014). For an opposing viewpoint, see Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is
a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 Drake L Rev
433, 470–74 (2014) (noting that the case law sometimes adverts to third-party interests,
but nonetheless concluding that, “generally speaking, the legal standards do not have a
consistent way of taking account of these impacts”).
42 See, for example, Marc DeGirolami, On the Claim That Exemptions from the
Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause (Law Professor Blogs Network, Dec 5, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/8GBW-T57U.
43 See, for example, Gedicks and Koppelman, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc at 54–56 (cited in note 41); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, and Nelson Tebbe, The Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate (Balkinization, Nov 27, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/665Q-EE23; Micah Schwartzman and Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and
Religion and Arguing off the Wall (Slate, Nov 26, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/Q96D-4AS8; Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of
Religion, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev 343, 356–72 (2014).
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religious objector’s request. I end the Article with a proposal for
a revised balancing test that captures this interplay.
Part I begins with a critical assessment of the understandings of complicity in both the majority and dissenting opinions
in Hobby Lobby. I argue that the majority was overly deferential
to the religious believer’s assertions of complicity, while the dissent operated with a conception of complicity that was too stringent. Looming over both positions is a disagreement about the
role that courts may play in evaluating complicity claims. A subsidiary aim of Part I is to tease apart what kinds of claims—
moral, empirical, or relational—courts must treat deferentially
out of respect for religion.
In Parts II and III, I draw out and critique the conception of
complicity immanent in the law. The aim here is twofold: First, I
seek to demonstrate that, had the Court relied on that conception rather than deferring to the more expansive one underpinning Hobby Lobby’s claims, the Court would have denied Hobby
Lobby an exemption. The Court’s own precedents, that is, would
have found Hobby Lobby to be too tenuously connected to the
conduct that it opposes to give its claim of complicity credence,
as I aim to show in Part II. 44 But I also argue, in Part III, that
the law’s understanding of complicity is not unassailable. In
particular, I aim to establish that considerations of proximity
play too prominent a role in complicity determinations and that
proximity is neither a reliable nor always a compelling guide
when it comes to judging whether someone has reason to feel
implicated in conduct that he deems wrong. I argue that proximity is given this prominence because we tend to feel more implicated in conduct to which we bear a closer causal relation,
whether or not we are in fact more complicit. In other words,
proximity tracks a subjective sense of complicity. But if what
matters is one’s subjective sense, then there is no reason to privilege the law’s conception of complicity over that of the religious
objector when the religious objector happens to feel complicit in
a greater range of conduct than the standard legal account contemplates. I conclude then that courts should, in general, take
claims of complicity at face value, at least when they do not rest
on factual errors.

See Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22
Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L 303, 329–30 (2014).
44
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That conclusion does not automatically entail that the religious objector is entitled to an exemption, however. For even
while courts should in general treat as true the religious adherent’s claim of complicity, they must still consider whether acceding to a request for an accommodation would impose undue burdens on third parties. In Part IV, I argue (pace Ginsburg’s
dissent) that the doctrine does not currently mandate the consideration of third-party costs and that this oversight is deeply
problematic. I then propose a revision to the test for religious accommodations that aims to include third-party considerations. I
conclude with some personal reflections.
A note about terminology before proceeding: I frame the issues here in reference to a business’s rights of conscience or religious freedom, or to those of its owners. I do not mean to imply
that the business itself, whether or not it is incorporated, can
exercise religion in its own right or have its own conscience. Indeed, elsewhere I argue that it cannot. 45 Instead, I use the term
“business” as a shorthand for “the members of the business who
have reason to feel implicated in its acts.” This is in keeping
with Hobby Lobby, which grounds its extension of RFRA rights
to the corporation in the free exercise rights of the corporation’s
individual members. 46
45 See Sepinwall, 5 Harv Bus L Rev at 178–90 (cited in note 27). For a preview of
some of these arguments, see Sepinwall, Can a Corporation Have a Conscience? (cited in
note 29); Amy Sepinwall, Corporate RFRA Rights and Complicity (The Conglomerate,
July 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SU52-WVE7. See also Amy J. Sepinwall,
Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate
Crime, 63 Hastings L J 411, 428–30 (2012) (arguing that corporations are not persons
and thus cannot bear moral responsibility); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 Va L Rev 1501, 1540–55 (2012) (arguing that institutions do not possess a
conscience).
46 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2768–72. I note that Hobby Lobby assumes, without argument, that the relevant members consist of only the closely held corporation’s
owners. Others have contested this assumption on the grounds that the company’s decisions about the provision of health care might contravene the deeply held convictions of
its employees and that employees too have reason to care about what the company does.
See, for example, id at 2795 (Ginsburg dissenting); Korte, 735 F3d at 722 (Rovner dissenting); Orts, The Legal and Social Ontology of the Firm (cited in note 27) (“Rights of
employees may be equal to those of owners and managers in this context.”); Sepper, 22
Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L at 319 (cited in note 44) (“In the case of disagreeing shareholders, whose beliefs matter? And what of employees who may not share the owners’
beliefs?”). But I do not seek to challenge this assumption here. Instead, I first assume
that there is a set of members who have exclusive authority over the corporation’s acts
and so have reason to care about how its acts redound to them. Second, I assume that
these members are entitled to seek exemptions from legal requirements to which the
corporation is otherwise subject by virtue of their own rights. I will refer to these members as “owners,” but I use that term provisionally. Those who think that there are
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I. COMPLICITY AND DEFERENCE
In this Part, I argue that the RFRA doctrine lends itself to
confusion about the scope of permissible complicity claims because it requires the person seeking an exemption to demonstrate
that a neutral law of general applicability imposes a “substantial” burden on the religious believer 47 and the question of
when a burden becomes “substantial” is undertheorized and
controversial. 48
In Part I.A, I begin with the Hobby Lobby owners’ claims in
an effort to clarify what is at stake—morally, for them, and conceptually, for the courts assessing these claims. To that end, I
distinguish among three different bases for evaluating the truth
of these claims—on moral, empirical, or relational grounds. I
then turn to the conceptions of complicity advanced in the
Court’s opinions. In Part I.B, I argue that the dissent accorded
too little deference to the owners’ beliefs. By contrast, the majority, as we shall see in Part I.C, was too solicitous, as it suggested
that challenging the owners on any ground was beyond the competence and prerogative of the Court. Part I.D returns to the
three dimensions on which conscientious objections might be
evaluated and addresses the extent of deference to be accorded
to each one.
A. Moral, Empirical, and Relational Elements of Complicity
Claims
The ACA’s contraceptive mandate requires coverage of all
FDA-approved forms of contraception. 49 Hobby Lobby objected to
four of these methods, on the ground that they pose a risk of
functioning as “abortifacients”—that is, drugs or devices that
non-owning members who are entitled to press their rights through the corporate form
may substitute for “owners” the generic name of these other constituents (for example,
employees, creditors, and so forth). For accounts of ownership that reveal its complexity,
see A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in A.G. Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A
Collaborative Work 107, 107–34 (Oxford 1961); Orts, Business Persons at 104–05 (cited
in note 30).
47 See notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
48 See generally, for example, Steven D. Smith and Caroline Mala Corbin, Debate,
The Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161 U Pa L Rev Online 261 (2013)
(staking opposite positions on how courts should think about the term “substantial” in
ascertaining whether the burden on the religious adherent is “substantial”).
49 See 80 Fed Reg at 41318 (cited in note 10) (incorporating by reference the Health
Resources and Services Administration’s guidelines on women’s preventive services). For
these guidelines, see Preventive Care Benefits for Women (HHS), archived at
http://perma.cc/4JD2-QGEM.
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destroy embryos. 50 The majority described Hobby Lobby’s concerns about subsidizing these forms of contraception in this way:
The owners of the businesses have [(1)] religious objections
to abortion, and [(2)] according to their religious beliefs the
four contraceptive methods at issue are abortifacients.
[(3)] If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating abortions.
...
[Doing so will connect them] to the destruction of an embryo
in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to
provide the coverage. 51
Claim (1) is a moral claim: the owners believe (on religious
grounds) that abortion is wrong. Moral claims assert propositions about right and wrong. Claim (2) is an empirical claim: the
owners believe that four of the forms of contraceptive coverage
that the ACA mandates work by aborting embryos. Claim (3) is
a relational claim: the owners believe that complying with the
HHS mandate—that is, “providing the coverage demanded by
the HHS regulations” 52—connects them to the conduct they
deem wrong, or relates them to the wrong, in a way that would
make them complicit. 53
All three of these claims are controversial, and many people
would reject each one. Clearly, a good many people deny that
abortion is wrong. 54 A greater percentage still think that abortion should be legal. 55 Claim (2) is even more controversial, as
the medical establishment firmly rejects the notion that any of
the contested forms of contraception works by destroying an embryo. 56 Finally, given how remote an employer’s contribution is
to his employees’ contraceptive choices, Hobby Lobby’s claim
See Cathy Lynn Grossman, What’s Abortifacient? Disputes over Birth Control
Fuel Obamacare Fight (Wash Post, Jan 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/P767-8SPN.
51 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2759, 2778. Note that the numbers in parentheses
were added to the block quotation to ease the exposition that follows.
52 Id at 2778.
53 This third claim in fact contains both a moral element and a relational one. I
elaborate on these elements in Part I.D.
54 See Lydia Saad, Americans Still Split along “Pro-Choice,” “Pro-Life” Lines (Gallup,
May 23, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9Y5-2W6R (reporting the results of a Gallup
poll indicating that 39 percent of Americans think that abortion is “morally acceptable,”
while 51 percent think that it is “morally wrong”).
55 See id (reporting on a contemporaneous poll in which 49 percent of Americans
identified as pro-choice, while 45 percent identified as pro-life).
56 See notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
50
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that the contraceptive mandate connects it to the supposedly
wrongful conduct flies in the face of the standard accounts of
complicity in law and morality, as we shall see in Part II.
In light of the idiosyncratic nature of Hobby Lobby’s views
on the permissibility of using or subsidizing others’ use of these
modes of contraception, the justices faced the difficult question
of whose views should prevail. Should they defer to Hobby
Lobby’s contention that it was complicit? Or was it within the
Court’s purview to judge the merits of the moral, empirical, and
relational predicates of that contention? As Part I.B demonstrates,
the dissent took issue with the moral and relational bases of
Hobby Lobby’s complicity claim; the majority, on the other hand,
refused to consider the merits of any of them.
B. Complicity as Intentional Participation
The dissent in Hobby Lobby maintained that the Court may
determine for itself whether the conscientious objector has reason to believe himself complicit in the conduct he opposes, and
that the locus for that determination is the substantial-burden
prong of RFRA’s test. 57 Other jurists and commentators agree. 58
They seize on the word “substantial” and contend that this word
requires courts “to distinguish large or considerable burdens
from minor or incidental ones.” 59 Otherwise, “any honestlyperceived burden on religion resulting from government action
would suffice to make out a prima facie free exercise claim.” 60
Notwithstanding the semantic plausibility of the argument,
however, it is far from clear that the doctrine’s treatment of the
substantial-burden prong in fact contemplates an inquiry into
whether the religious adherent is right to think himself complicit in the conduct his religion opposes, let alone an inquiry into
whether he is rendered sufficiently complicit such that his burden counts as “substantial.” Nor does Ginsburg make good on
Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2798–99 (Ginsburg dissenting).
See, for example, Wheaton College v Burwell, 134 S Ct 2806, 2812 (2014)
(Sotomayor dissenting) (“Not every sincerely felt ‘burden’ is a ‘substantial’ one, and it is
for courts, not litigants, to identify which are.”); Korte v Sebelius, 735 F3d 654, 708 (7th
Cir 2013) (Rovner dissenting), cert denied, 134 S Ct 2903 (2014). In her closing statement in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online debate, Professor Caroline
Corbin presages Justice Ginsburg’s contention that the term “substantial” means that
not just any burden should count under RFRA. Smith and Corbin, Debate, 161 U Pa L
Rev Online at 279 (cited in note 48).
59 Korte, 735 F3d at 708 (Rovner dissenting).
60 Id (Rovner dissenting).
57
58
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her contention that judges enjoy a prerogative to assess the
strength of complicity claims. 61 If anything, in many cases the
substantial-burden inquiry elides the question of complicity altogether and focuses exclusively on the extent of the penalty the
adherent would face were he to decline to follow the law. 62 The
burden, then, tracks the consequences of noncompliance with the
challenged legal requirement, not the repercussions of compliance.
The dissent in Hobby Lobby, however, was unperturbed, and
it sought to contest Hobby Lobby’s claim of complicity on moral

61 Ginsburg articulated a distinction between “‘factual allegations that [the
plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,’ which a court must accept as
true, and the ‘legal conclusion . . . that [the plaintiffs’] religious exercise is substantially
burdened,’ an inquiry the court must undertake.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2798
(Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Kaemmerling v Lappin, 553 F3d 669, 679 (DC Cir 2008).
But the two cases she cited do not support her assertion that courts may judge whether
the religious adherent is right to believe himself complicit in the conduct contravening
his religious convictions. Instead, in both cases, the Court punted on the question whether the adherent’s burden was substantial because, in both, the Court concluded that the
asserted burden was not of the kind that courts need to recognize in the first place. Thus,
in the first case Ginsburg cited, Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693 (1986), the Court asserted that
the Free Exercise Clause did not include a right of the religious believer to mandate that
the government conduct its affairs in a manner consistent with the believer’s faith. Id at
699–700. The issue there, then, was not so much whether the believer would be complicit
in the government’s conduct of its own affairs as it was whether his concerns about his
(supposed) complicity warranted accommodation. The second case, Hernandez v
Commission of Internal Revenue, 490 US 680 (1989), did speculate about whether the
alleged burden was substantial, but it did not conclusively decide the issue, arguing that
even if the burden were substantial, the government’s compelling interest would justify
the burden’s imposition. Id at 699. Put differently, we might see the issue here in terms
similar to those in Roy: the question might be not “Does the regulation impose a substantial burden on the religious adherents?” so much as it is (and as it was in Roy) “Is this
the kind of burden we have reason to accommodate?” Neither Roy nor Hernandez, then,
stands for the proposition that the substantial-burden inquiry invites the Court to challenge a believer’s assertion that he is complicit (although, again, it does permit the Court
to determine whether to exempt him at the end of the day).
62 Compare University of Notre Dame v Sebelius, 743 F3d 547, 558 (7th Cir 2014)
(“Notre Dame may consider the process a substantial burden, but substantiality—like
compelling governmental interest—is for the court to decide.”), and Kaemmerling, 553
F3d at 678 (“An inconsequential or de minimis burden on religious practice does not rise
to [the level of a substantial burden under RFRA], nor does a burden on activity unimportant to the adherent’s religious scheme.”), with Korte, 735 F3d at 683, quoting Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc v Sebelius, 723 F3d 1114, 1137 (10th Cir 2013):

[W]e agree with our colleagues in the Tenth Circuit that the substantialburden test under RFRA focuses primarily on the “intensity of the coercion applied by the government to act contrary to [religious] beliefs.” . . . Put another
way, the substantial-burden inquiry evaluates the coercive effect of the governmental pressure on the adherent’s religious practice and steers well clear of
deciding religious questions.
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and relational grounds. 63 More specifically, the dissent judged
the owners’ claims of complicity against its own understanding,
which can be summarized by this proposition: unless an actor
has (1) taken part in the decision to pursue some act and
(2) participated directly in that act, he should not be taken to be
responsible for that act. I take up each of these supposed requirements in turn.
1. Decisionmaking and complicity.
The dissent, along with some commentators and some of the
lower court opinions in the contraceptive-mandate challenges,
maintained that the mandate does not make the employer complicit in its employees’ uses of contraception because the employer does not participate in the decision about whether to use
contraception. 64 As Ginsburg stated, “the decisions whether to
claim benefits under the plans are made not by Hobby Lobby or
Conestoga, but by the covered employees and dependents, in
consultation with their health care providers.” 65 As such, “[n]o
individual decision by an employee and her physician—be it to
use contraception, treat an infection, or have a hip replaced—is
in any meaningful sense [her employer’s] decision or action.” 66
Judge Ilana Rovner, dissenting in a Seventh Circuit mandate
challenge, made a similar argument, contending that
“[a]lthough funds from the company health plan are being used
to facilitate [the employee’s contraceptive] choice, no objective
observer would attribute that choice to the company, let alone
its owner.” 67 And so, Ginsburg and Rovner each concluded, the

63 By contrast, the dissent agreed with the majority that courts “must accept as
true” the religious objectors’ factual allegations. Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2798
(Ginsburg dissenting). I argue that deference to the objectors’ understanding of the facts
is unwarranted. See Part I.D.2.
64 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting); Grote v Sebelius, 708 F3d
850, 865 (7th Cir 2013) (Rovner dissenting). See also Autocam Corp v Sebelius, 2012 WL
6845677, *7 (WD Mich):

The mandate does not compel the [owners] as individuals to do anything. They
do not have to use or buy contraceptives for themselves or anyone else. It is only the legally separate entities they currently own that have any obligation under the mandate. The law protects that separation between the corporation
and its owners.
65
66
67

Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting).
Id (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Grote, 708 F3d at 865 (Rovner dissenting).
Korte, 735 F3d at 718 (Rovner dissenting).
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employee’s decision cannot impose a substantial burden on the
employer’s exercise of religion. 68
The argument here is familiar from cases in which taxpayers have raised Establishment Clause objections to public funding for programs when the funding recipient elects to use the
funds at a religious institution. Thus, for example, in Zelman v
Simmons-Harris, 69 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a
school voucher program compelled taxpayers to subsidize religion. 70 The Court reasoned that because the program did not
privilege or otherwise single out religious institutions, and because public money reached religious schools solely by way of
“genuine and independent private choice,” taxpayers had no reason to think that they or the government was funding religion. 71
The general form of these arguments is as follows: the objector does not choose the conduct he deems objectionable, so he is
not responsible for that conduct. Yet this is a very cramped view
of complicity, for it presumes that one can be complicit only in
conduct that one chooses. 72 The real question here is not whether an employee’s decision belongs to, or is attributable to, her
employer, but instead whether the employer bears some responsibility for the employee’s act even if the employer did not participate in the decision to pursue that act.
To see that one can bear responsibility for another’s act independent of whether one took part in the decision to pursue
that act, consider a gun merchant who sells a weapon that she
knows the buyer will use to kill someone else. There is no sense
in which the decision to kill this other person is the merchant’s.
Here, as in the contraceptive-mandate case, there is an “interruption” in the causal “linkage” between the merchant’s act and

68 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting); Korte, 735 F3d at 718
(Rovner dissenting).
69 536 US 639 (2002).
70 Id at 662–63. See also Witters v Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
474 US 481, 489 (1986) (upholding, against an Establishment Clause challenge, the use
of state financial aid for tuition at a Christian college at which the recipient was to pursue bible studies); Zobrest v Catalina Foothills School District, 509 US 1, 13–14 (1993)
(rejecting an Establishment Clause claim objecting to the use of public funding for a sign
language interpreter for a student attending a Catholic high school).
71 Simmons-Harris, 536 US at 652.
72 Compare H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law 129 (Oxford 2d ed
1985) (articulating an interventionist position supporting Ginsburg’s dissent), with
Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics 233–53 (Oxford 2009) (arguing that an accomplice’s responsibility does not evaporate simply because the perpetrator’s intention “intervenes” in the causal chain).
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the killing—namely, the decision on the part of the buyer to
commit the killing. 73 But the mere fact that the decision is not
the merchant’s does not absolve her of moral responsibility for
the resulting death. (Nor would she necessarily escape criminal
liability under the law.) 74 And indeed, many of us would hold
that she is complicit in the killing, because she provided the gun
to the killer knowing that he would use it as a murder weapon,
and without seeking to prevent the killing, warn the victim or
police, and so on.
Moreover, on other accounts of shared responsibility, something even less than knowledge can be enough to sustain a
judgment of complicity. 75 Thus, on these accounts, a person can
be complicit in another’s wrong if he merely shares the wrongful
attitudes that motivated the wrong (for example, all racist individuals share responsibility for a racially motivated crime), 76 or
if he and the perpetrator are participating in a joint project that
the wrong furthers, even if he did not know and had no reason to
know that the perpetrator would choose wrongful means to advance their shared end. 77 In short, conceptions of complicity may
be far more expansive than the dissent recognizes.
73 The quoted language here borrows from the terminology Ginsburg used in her
dissenting opinion: “It is doubtful that Congress, when it specified that burdens must be
‘substantia[l],’ had in mind a linkage thus interrupted by independent decisionmakers
(the woman and her health counselor) standing between the challenged government action and the religious exercise claimed to be infringed.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799
(Ginsburg dissenting).
74 Backun v United States, 112 F2d 635, 637 (4th Cir 1940) (“One who sells a gun to
another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder, would hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by showing that he received full price for the gun.”).
For an excellent and probing overview of accomplice liability under domestic and criminal law in the context of weapons provision, see generally James G. Stewart, The Accomplice Liability of Arms Vendors: A Conceptual Defense (unpublished manuscript, July 11,
2014) (on file with author).
75 See, for example, Larry May, Sharing Responsibility 50 (Chicago 1992) (noting
that one can bear responsibility for a hate crime, for example, simply because one publicly endorsed the attitudes that the crime expresses); Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics
and Law for a Collective Age 107–12, 147–61 (Cambridge 2000) (grounding shared responsibility in shared ends, even when one party undertakes measures to achieve those
ends that another party opposes); Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility: New
Essays in Plural Subject Theory 14–16 (Rowman & Littlefield 2000) (grounding shared
responsibility for a group act in the obligations that members owe one another to form
and sustain a “plural subject” of their joint activity).
76 See May, Sharing Responsibility at 50 (cited in note 75).
77 See Kutz, Complicity at 156–61 (cited in note 75). The understanding of complicity here is embodied in the kind of conspiracy liability captured in the Pinkerton doctrine.
See Pinkerton v United States, 328 US 640, 647–48 (1946) (establishing a rule of conspiracy liability in which a conspirator may be liable for criminal offenses committed by a
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With that said, it is certainly not the case that facilitation
always makes the facilitator responsible for the act or choice
that he facilitates. 78 The point is instead that an account denying that one can be complicit in an act unless one chooses that
act overlooks a great many ways in which one can be responsible.
2. Complicity as direct participation.
Ginsburg’s overly narrow view of complicity finds an echo in
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent in Wheaton College v Burwell,79
which the two other female justices joined. In that case, Wheaton
College, “an explicitly Christian” institution, 80 contended that it
would be complicit in contraceptive use as a result of its filling
out a form registering its objection to the contraceptive mandate, because filling out the form would “trigger[ ] the obligation
for someone else to provide the services to which it objects.” 81 In
response, the dissent argued that Wheaton’s “claim ignores that
the provision of contraceptive coverage is triggered not by its
completion of the self-certification form, but by federal law.” 82 To
buttress its argument, the dissent borrowed an analogy that Judge
Posner invoked in another contraceptive-mandate challenge.
In University of Notre Dame v Sebelius, 83 Posner described a
scenario involving a Quaker who seeks an exemption from a
wartime draft because he subscribes to his religion’s pacifism. 84
coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy).
78 For example, if one is innocently ignorant of the fact that one acts in facilitation
of a crime, one will not bear responsibility for that crime. Further, the same result obtains if one knows that one facilitates a crime but one does not do anything additional to
what one was on track to do anyway. See Benton Martin and Jeremiah Newhall, Technology and the Guilty Mind: When Do Technology Providers Become Criminal Accomplices? J Crim L & Crimin *41–42 (forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/JUQ9-9T85
(arguing that the bus driver who knowingly drives a passenger to the passenger’s intended crime scene is not culpable, but the taxi driver who does so is, since the bus driver does not deviate from his scheduled route—he literally does not go out of his way to
provide the assistance—whereas the taxi driver’s act is directly responsive to the
criminal’s plan).
79 134 S Ct 2806 (2014).
80 About Wheaton (Wheaton College), archived at http://perma.cc/43JN-KYJH.
81 Wheaton College, 134 S Ct at 2808 (Sotomayor dissenting). See also Notre Dame,
743 F3d at 554.
82 Wheaton College, 134 S Ct at 2808 (Sotomayor dissenting). Seven of the eight
federal appellate courts to hear challenges to the proposed accommodation have adopted
similar reasoning and have thus ruled against the challengers. See note 12.
83 743 F3d 547 (7th Cir 2014).
84 Id at 556.
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The selective service officer grants the Quaker the exemption
but then notes that someone else will be drafted in his place. 85
The Quaker is indignant, insisting that recruiting someone else
will violate the very religious belief that prompted him to seek
the exemption in the first instance: “Because [the Quaker’s] religion teaches that no one should bear arms, drafting another person in his place would make him responsible for the military activities of his replacement.” 86 But, Posner continued, the Quaker
is in fact responsible neither for the drafting of a replacement
nor for any fighting in which the replacement participates. 87 By
“exempting him[,] the government [has not] forced him to ‘trigger’ the drafting of a replacement who was not a conscientious
objector.” 88 As such, Posner concluded that RFRA does not “require a draft exemption for both the Quaker and his non-Quaker
replacement.” 89
The conclusion here is right: RFRA does not require the military to forsake finding a replacement for the pacifist to whom it
grants an exemption. But the conclusion does not follow from
the argument preceding it. The Quaker does in fact cause military participation that would not have occurred otherwise:
someone will end up serving who would not have served but for
the Quaker’s exemption. The situation would be different if the
military called someone up—call him Smith—but then turned
Smith away, deciding that he was unfit for service. The selective
service officer would then go to the next name on the list and
someone—say, Jones—would end up serving who would not
have been recruited but for the unfitness of Smith. Smith would
not have “triggered” Jones’s recruitment. What distinguishes
Smith from the Quaker, then? It is the very choice that the exemption opponents invoke as the consideration that makes the
moral difference: The Quaker chooses not to serve, thereby altering the set of individuals who do serve by virtue of his intentional act. But Smith is turned away; the fact that someone else will
serve in his place is not attributable to him.
Moreover, suppose that Posner and Sotomayor were right
that it is the draft itself that does the triggering, not the
Id.
Id.
87 Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 556.
88 Id. This quotation, as well as the one in the text accompanying the following
note, has been altered such that the rhetorical questions in the original are recast here
as the assertions that the rhetorical questions are meant to imply.
89 Id.
85
86
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Quaker’s successful bid for an exemption. The Quaker and
Smith are still distinguishable on moral grounds because the
Quaker would have an independent reason for caring about the
fact that someone will be replacing him that Smith (who presumably is not a pacifist) does not have. What matters for the
Quaker is not (or not only) that his choice places someone in battle who would have escaped the draft were it not for the
Quaker’s exemption; it is that the Quaker’s exemption is undermined if the result for the world—one more soldier fighting—
is the same whether or not the Quaker is granted the exemption.
One does no more than an end run around the moral prohibitions that should constrain one’s conduct—in the Quaker’s case,
the prohibition against participating in warfare—if one merely
outsources the prohibited conduct. 90 This is not to say that the
military must, as a matter of respecting the Quaker’s objection,
desist from finding someone to take his place; the cost to the war
effort of reducing the number of available soldiers so that no
conscientious objector is replaced might well be too great. But it
is to point out that the Quaker’s objection to the military’s replacing him has some merit, Posner’s (or Sotomayor’s) rejection
of it notwithstanding. If there is a reason to deny the Quaker’s
request that no one replace him, then, it is not because he has
no legitimate reason to think himself complicit in the fighting in
which his replacement will engage but because the burden on
others of acceding to the request is more than he has a right to
impose. A similar line of argument can be used to demonstrate
that the religious nonprofits’ objections to HHS’s accommodation
procedure are also on firmer footing than most rulings on their
challenges have recognized. 91
90 See, for example, Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitution, 23
Const Commen 365, 375 (2006) (“If it would be a violation of your conscience to do X, it
should similarly be a violation of conscience if you pay other people to do X.”); Ed
Hedemann, ed, Guide to War Tax Resistance 94 (War Resisters League 3d ed 1986)
(“[I]t’s immoral to pay someone to do what it would be immoral to do yourself . . . War is
immoral, and I can’t pay taxes that will buy war.”). The idea that one cannot escape
complicity by having someone else do the thing that one’s religion prohibits is common in
religious doctrine and practice. In Jewish law, for example, it is impermissible to employ
a “Shabbos goy”—that is, a non-Jew whom one asks to carry out on one’s behalf some of
the tasks prohibited on Shabbat. See Aryeh Citron, The Myth of the “Shabbos Goy”
(Chabad-Lubavitch Media Center), archived at http://perma.cc/SLV9-VN8Z; Joseph Jacobs and Judah David Eisenstein, Shabbat Goy (Jewish Encyclopedia), archived at
http://perma.cc/X6X8-2FU5.
91 Most of the courts considering these challenges have contended that nonprofits
do not trigger contraceptive coverage by filling out a form registering their objections to
the contraceptive mandate and so they are not complicit in that contraceptive coverage;
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as such, the accommodation procedure does not substantially burden their religious
exercise. See note 12. For a succinct statement of the argument against the objectors, see
University of Notre Dame v Burwell, 786 F3d 606, 614 (7th Cir 2015).
These cases address the revised accommodation procedure. The original procedure,
challenged in Wheaton College, required the religious nonprofit to notify its TPA of its
objection. See note 10. The new procedure requires no more of the religious objector than
that it notify HHS of its objection; it is then HHS’s responsibility to notify the TPA. 79
Fed Reg at 51094–95 (cited in note 10). So, relative to the policy contemplated by the Supreme Court in Wheaton College, the new procedure contains one more layer of bureaucracy, and so one more layer of insulation, between the nonprofit and the party subsidizing contraception.
With that said, there are at least two reasons to have sympathy for the nonprofits’
contention that the new procedure does not alleviate their complicity concerns. First, the
premise underlying the new procedure is itself suspect: The thought seems to be that by
having HHS serve as an intermediary between the nonprofit and the TPA, the connection between the nonprofit and contraceptive coverage is made more tenuous and so the
magnitude of culpability that the nonprofit bears should be diminished. But the presumed connection between proximity and culpability is wrongheaded, for reasons I articulate in Part III.B–C.
Second, the argument about triggering fails to take seriously the felt experience of
contributing to conduct that one deems gravely wrong. Imagine the following hypothetical: Suppose that the government has decided that it is permissible to kill young babies
for sport so long as one has a license to do so. Suppose further that the government has
determined that a key way for individuals to obtain such licenses is through their employers. The government recognizes that some employers object to infanticide, so it develops a policy whereby objecting employers can register their objections with the government, which will then let a third-party provider know that it should issue the licenses
to the employees of the objecting organization in the organization’s stead. If the objecting
organization does not register its objection, the government will find a way of letting the
third-party provider know of its obligations. Specifically, the government will have to do
more work to determine the identity of the provider and the names of the eligible employees. But at the end of the day, the outcome will be the same. That is, the same number of licenses will be issued whether or not the employer issues them, whether or not
the employer formally registers its objection with the government, or whether the employer refuses to participate and the government has to gather the relevant information
on its own. Suppose, finally, that the objecting employer knows all of this: it knows that,
no matter what it does, the same number of babies will be killed. Would it then be unreasonable for the employer to refuse to register its objection?
I think not. For someone with objections to infanticide, issuing the killing licenses
should of course be out of the question. But seeking an accommodation is not without its
moral costs, too. Filing an objection would signal that one’s worry lies with one’s own
participation, rather than with the practice itself; it would ratify the accommodation
scheme and so imply that one saw infanticide as a practice about which reasonable
minds could differ. But one who genuinely thought that infanticide was wrong would not
want to have anything to do with it at all. He should refuse to take part in any aspect of
the practice that would normalize it. This includes acceding to the government’s accommodation procedure. So the objector need not think that registering his objection “triggers” the issuance of licenses for him to think that he has a valid reason to object; he can
instead see his refusal to register as a meaningful way for him to protest a scheme that
allows anyone to do something that he deems deplorable.
To be clear, this hypothetical is not intended to suggest that killing babies is the
moral equivalent of using contraception. The point is instead that, for someone who sees
some act as a grave moral wrong, doing anything other than refusing to have any part in
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More generally, the flaw in the Quaker analogy and the decisions denying that the accommodation procedure imposes a
substantial burden is that they acknowledge complicity only for
those acts in which one participates directly, ignoring the possible responsibility one comes to bear through a surrogate, or by
facilitating someone else’s commission of a wrong, or perhaps
even just by legitimating the overarching scheme through which
others are permitted to commit wrongs. 92 We shall see that this
narrow understanding of complicity permeates much of the legal
and moral treatment of conscientious objection, and that much
of this understanding is problematically chary. 93 Before turning
to a more general survey and critique of the conceptions of complicity in the law and their moral underpinnings, however, we
should assess the understanding of complicity in the majority
opinion, for it is as troublingly broad as the dissent’s is narrow.
C. Complicity as Subjective Implication
The majority described what was at stake for the religious
owners in Hobby Lobby in this way: “[The owners] believe that
providing the coverage demanded by the HHS regulations is
connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage.” 94 The
majority insisted that “it [was] not for [the Court] to say that
[the owners’] religious beliefs [were] mistaken or insubstantial.” 95 The owners believed that the mandate imposed a “substantial burden” on their religious exercise, and the Court took
them at their word. 96
In so doing, the majority accepted at face value the owners’
factual assertion that the four contraceptive measures to which

the act will evoke reasonable concerns about complicity. Courts and commentators
addressing challenges to the accommodation procedure fail to appreciate this fact, I believe, only because they illicitly allow their sense that contraceptive use is permissible to
inform their judgments about whether objectors have reason to feel like the accommodation procedures are morally inculpating. After all, there can be no complicity if there is
no wrong to start with. I have no objection to contraceptive use, but I do think that we
need to take more seriously the perspective of those who do. The concededly dramatic
reference to infanticide is meant to illustrate what taking the objectors’ perspective seriously might entail.
92 For a hypothetical example of this last source of complicity, see note 91.
93 See Parts II, III.
94 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778.
95 Id at 2779.
96 Id.
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they objected result in the “destruction of an embryo,” 97 even
though the medical community does not believe that this is how
these measures in fact work. 98 The majority deferred to the owners’ moral claim that it is wrong to destroy embryos. And the
majority further accepted the owners’ relational claim that the
contraceptive mandate would connect the owners to this (supposed) destruction in a way that would render them complicit in
it. In short, the majority deferred completely to the owners’ factual, moral, and relational claims. The Court’s unhesitating deference stands in stark contrast to the dissent’s approach, which
evidenced an equally unhesitating effort to review, and then reject, the owners’ belief that they would be complicit in embryo
destruction were they to subsidize coverage of (alleged) abortifacients. Which approach should we prefer: one that does or does
not seek to judge the factual, moral, and relational underpinnings of a complicity claim? It is now time to assess just which of
these elements, if any, warrants deference.
D. Deference to Nonstandard Beliefs
In this Section, I treat each of the dimensions of the owners’
complicity claim—its moral, empirical, and relational elements—in turn. In so doing, I assume that the owners’ beliefs
are sincerely held. Sincerity is an independent basis on which a
court may inquire into the cogency of a bid for religious accommodation. 99 Some commentators have suggested that some of
those who seek an exemption from the contraceptive mandate
might be feigning objections to contraception on opportunistic
grounds in order to lower their insurance costs or curry favor
with their religious customer base. 100 These objectors are not the
protagonists of my inquiry, however. I mean to focus only on the
employers who genuinely believe that some or all contraceptive
use (or blood transfusions or the like) are wrong, and that subsiId at 2775.
See notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
99 See Ben Adams and Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the
Courts after Hobby Lobby, 67 Stan L Rev Online 59, 59–60 (2014) (“[C]ourts historically
have demonstrated that they are able to ferret out insincere religious claims. There is a
long tradition of courts competently scrutinizing asserted religious beliefs for sincerity
without delving into their validity or verity.”).
100 See, for example, Alan J. Meese and Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate
Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127
Harv L Rev F 273, 293 (2014) (noting the risk of opportunism in both corporate and individual claims for accommodations under RFRA).
97
98
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dizing a wrong renders them morally responsible for it. The doctrine already permits courts to inquire into the sincerity of the
objector’s professed religious beliefs, and I leave it to courts to
ferret out the opportunists from the true believers.
Further, the objectors that I consider must operate with
strong opposition to contributing to the conduct that they deem
wrong. A mild preference to abstain will not do; instead, it must
be the case that contributing would cause the objector to experience a deep rift in his self, so much so that he would be willing
to incur some penalty to avoid betraying his convictions. 101 We
should require this strength of conviction because the objector,
like other citizens, bears a duty of political obedience, 102 and
mere distaste for a legal requirement is not sufficient to overcome this duty. Instead, if he is to prevail in his bid for an exemption from a law that binds his compatriots, the objector
must have reasons strong enough for his compatriots to think
him justified—not on the merits necessarily but simply by virtue
of the inner turmoil that obedience would cause. I will not try to
identify precisely how strong these reasons should be or how we
should determine their strength, but I assume that the typical
sentiments voiced around claims of conscience—for example, “I
couldn’t live with myself if I were to . . .”103 or “I would rather suffer punishment than obey . . .”104—would, if sincere, be sufficiently
101 See Plato, Gorgias 38 (Liberal Arts 1952) (W.C. Helmbold, trans) (“[Socrates:]
And I, for my part, imagine that you and I and everyone else believe that to do wrong is
worse than to be wronged and that not to be punished for wrongdoing is worse than to
suffer punishment.”). See also Martin Luther King Jr, Letter from a Birmingham Jail
[King, Jr.] (University of Pennsylvania), archived at http://perma.cc/S3CT-HV98 (“I
submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who
willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.”);
Girouard v United States, 328 US 61, 68 (1946) (“Throughout the ages, men have suffered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the authority of the State.
Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment is the product of that struggle.”).
102 See, for example, Margaret Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society 91 (Clarendon 2006); H.L.A. Hart, Are There
Any Natural Rights?, 64 Philosophical Rev 175, 185 (1955). See also generally Michael O.
Hardimon, Role Obligations, 91 J Phil 333 (1994); John Horton, Political Obligation
(Humanities 1992).
103 See Paul Formosa, Thinking, Conscience and Acting in Times of Crises, in
Andrew Schaap, Danielle Celermajer, and Vrasidas Karalis, eds, Power, Judgment and
Political Evil: In Conversation with Hannah Arendt 89, 94 (Ashgate 2010) (describing
Hannah Arendt’s view of conscience as “advising on the pain of being unable to live with
oneself that one ought not to perform certain actions”).
104 See note 101. But see Jonathan Bennett, The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn, 49
Phil 123, 133 (1974) (arguing that conscience will typically track received moral or legal
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strong. The idea might be cashed out in a norm of reciprocity:
were others to feel as tormented as the objector does, they too
would expect an exemption from the legal requirement (assuming that their exemption imposed no more costs on third parties
or the legal regime, at any rate). So they should recognize the
objector’s desire to avoid this torment as a legitimate ground for
an exemption. With that said, worries about sincerity might
arise anew—here, with respect not to whether the objector holds
the asserted conviction but instead to whether violating it will
cause him as much pain as he claims. Again, though, courts are
empowered to evaluate whether the objector really is as beset by
inner turmoil as he contends. So much, then, for concerns about
insincere or casual objectors.
But there is another set of mandate opponents whom I do
not consider here. As some commentators have compellingly argued, some of the opposition to the mandate is intended not (or
not merely) to avoid complicity in contraceptive use but instead
(or in addition) to prevent that use altogether. 105 If these commentators are right, then what is at stake in some of the mandate cases is not an interest in being left alone, as it was in the
traditional religious freedom cases. 106 Instead, we should see
that some of the opponents of the mandate mean to undermine
women’s access to contraception—with potentially devastating
effects for women’s equality. 107 For example, Professors Douglas
NeJaime and Reva Siegel detail the ways in which some bids for
a conscientious exemption from the contraceptive mandate, or
from antidiscrimination laws that would protect gays and lesbians, function as the next frontier in the culture wars. They marshal statements from advocates at the front lines who articulate
an evangelical mission: the goal for these advocates is to urge
and impose on others a “traditional morality” in which contraprecepts that guide conduct through reasoned argument, while sympathy or compassion,
typically viscerally felt, can be a truer guide to morally right action).
105 See, for example, NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2520 (cited in note 28).
106 See id at 2524–56.
107 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Republican War against Women (Justia, Oct 3,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6LZC-F9HH (“This is not simply a move to ensure that
contraception isn’t paid for; it is an all-out war on women. This is the pushback to the
feminist revolution, and it is being fostered by the religious organizations that believe
that women should be subservient to men.”); Ruth Rosen, The War against Contraception: “Women Must Be Liberated from Their Libidios” (Huffington Post, Apr 21, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/B88D-H7S5 (quoting Ilyse Hogue, president of the National
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, who stated that “[t]he truth is that
this is not about religious freedom, it’s about sexism, and a fear of women’s sexuality”).
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ception (along with abortion and same-sex marriage) is verboten. 108 NeJaime and Siegel convincingly argue that the strategy
of these religious advocates is an example of “preservation
through transformation”: 109 “[W]hen an existing legal regime is
successfully challenged so that its rules and reasons no longer
seem persuasive or legitimate, defenders may adopt new rules
and reasons that preserve elements of the challenged regime.”110
Put differently, religious opponents of women’s reproductive
rights or same-sex marriage wield the banner of religious liberty
in an effort to secure through courts the outcome denied to them
in Congress (or state legislatures)—to wit, a culture that is inhospitable to the practices and lifestyles that they deplore on religious or ideological grounds.
The strategies and motives that NeJaime and Siegel describe should leave those of us committed to both equality and
toleration deeply dismayed. Nonetheless, I do not consider the
political and ideological use of complicity claims further. The inquiry here is intended to reach beyond the contraceptive mandate to cases in which there is a genuine conflict between a religious adherent who, with entirely benign motives, objects to
some legal requirement and accommodating his objection imposes costs on others. I assume that at least some of those objecting
to the employer mandate really do care only for the state of their
own souls, and I mean to examine how the law should respond
to them. This is already a vexing problem, and, as it arises in
the contraceptive-mandate context (as well as in contexts involving refusals to cover the health-care costs of homosexual employees’ spouses, or to serve gay or lesbian customers), it already
implicates concerns about equality. It will be worth clarifying
the proper response to a straightforward, genuine conflict between conscience and third-party interests, including the interests of discrete, historically oppressed groups. I leave questions
about bids for religious accommodations aimed at sabotaging a
NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2542–54 (cited in note 28).
Id at 2552–53 & n 151. For Siegel’s seminal articulations of her “preservation
through transformation” paradigm, see Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating
as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L J 2117, 2119 (1996); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan
L Rev 1111, 1113 (1997). For NeJaime’s extension of that work to the context of sexual
orientation, see Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Perpetuation of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 Cal L
Rev 1169, 1212–13 (2012).
110 NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2553 (cited in note 28).
108
109
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legislative regime or expressing animus toward women or homosexuals for another day. 111
1. Moral deference.
Deference to the moral claim at issue in a conscientious objection requires a court to take at face value the objector’s claim
that his religion finds some act or practice morally impermissible. This form of deference is not difficult to defend.
In moral and religious matters, we are often without a capacity for certitude that would allow us to discern truth and falsity. 112 Thus, some theorists defend moral deference on the part
of the state on the basis of the skepticism and humility that we
owe one another as compatriots in a pluralistic society. 113 Moral
deference also protects against “the totalization of morality” on
the part of the government. 114 And moral convictions can be
deeply entwined with a person’s sense of self and purpose. Given
that we lack agreed-upon ways to adjudicate among moral convictions, and given the importance that these convictions can
play in a person’s life, the state should generally refrain from
declaring these convictions true or false. In other words, moral
deference is the appropriate stance for a polity rife with multiple
and competing conceptions of the good. 115 Thus, the doctrine here
is generally correct in finding that it is not for courts “to say that
the line [of permissibility drawn by the religious adherent is] an
unreasonable one.” 116

111 I aim to address some of these issues in Amy J. Sepinwall, The Challenges of
Conscience in a World of Compromise, in Jack Knight, ed, Nomos: Compromise (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
112 Professor Simon Căbulea May has implicitly embraced the view that we can and
should adjudicate moral claims on the basis of their truth or falsity. See Simon Căbulea
May, Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy, 33 Phil & Pub Aff 317, 336
(2005) (“Complicity in an activity is only really a moral problem if that activity really is
unethical. Merely believing it to be immoral does not in itself ground a claim to special
treatment.”).
113 See, for example, M.M. Moody-Adams, Democratic Conflict and the Political Morality of Compromise *17 (unpublished manuscript, Jan 2014) (on file with author); Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 85 (Belknap 1996).
114 Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U Ill L Rev
1457, 1494.
115 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 133–34 (Columbia 1993) (noting the difficulties of maintaining stability and unity in a democratic society, given a citizenry deeply divided on religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines).
116 Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 US 707,
715 (1981).
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With that said, one might think that there are some moral
beliefs so objectionable that they deserve no deference at all.
Consider, for example, the belief that “homosexuality is wrong”
(or, worse still, that “homosexuals are evil”). Shouldn’t there be
limits on moral deference to ensure that courts—which are state
actors par excellence 117—are not compelled to treat animus on
par with other moral beliefs?
Two responses are in order. First, according deference to a
claim that denigrates another group is not the same as endorsing that claim. A court faced with such a claim should treat it
with deference but also clearly articulate that the claim flies in
the face of our most fundamental constitutional values. Courts,
that is, must not only serve religious freedom but also speak in
favor of the notion of equal respect that underpins our constitutional regime. 118 Second, deferring to this religious claim does
not commit a court to issuing an exemption as a result. The
court must still weigh the objector’s assertion against the government’s interest. 119 In some instances, the government will invoke its compelling interest in the eradication of, say, racism,
and it will wield that interest to defeat the bid for an exemption.
Thus, for example, in Bob Jones University v United States,120
the Government withdrew the university’s tax-exempt status, on
public policy grounds. Bob Jones had a policy of denying admission to students who had married outside their race and expelling students who dated or married interracially while enrolled. 121 The Government contended that nonprofit status
should be held only by entities that advance a public purpose, 122
there is a public policy against racial discrimination, an entity
that violates a public policy cannot be advancing a public

117 See, for example, Shelley v Kramer, 334 US 1, 15 (1948) (“[J]udicial action is to
be regarded as action of the State.”); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US (10 Otto) 339, 347 (1879)
(“A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no
other way.”).
118 See Corey Brettschneider, How Should Liberal Democracies Respond to FaithBased Groups That Advocate Discrimination? State Funding and Nonprofit Status, in
Austin Sarat, ed, Legal Responses to Religious Practices in the United States: Accommodation and Its Limits 72, 74–75 (Cambridge 2012) (describing “democratic persuasion,” or the state’s responsibility to counter freedom of expression, with efforts to
explain why discriminatory viewpoints “are inconsistent with a respect for free and
equal citizenship”).
119 See notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
120 461 US 574 (1983).
121 Id at 580–81.
122 Id at 588.
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purpose, and so Bob Jones did not qualify for nonprofit status. 123
As I suggest below, this argument does not target racism as
squarely as we might like. 124 But it does nonetheless stand as an
instance in which the government recognizes the religious entity’s genuine conviction but then defeats that conviction on the
basis of its own compelling interests.
Moreover, as I argue below, courts must weigh the objectionable moral conviction against not only the government’s interests but also the interests of third parties. 125 Third parties
will presumably be able to marshal arguments that acceding to
the believer’s hateful claim inflicts a grave injury on them—one
so grave that the court should find it dispositive. But even if
third parties choose not to become too vexed about the believer’s
claim, 126 the state must, again in its capacity as a defender of our
constitutional regime, add to its arguments about the compelling
interests underpinning the challenged legal requirement a
statement decrying the challenge because it deviates from our
most cherished constitutional values.
In short, then, moral deference should be absolute, but it
need not be enthusiastic, and it is but the first step in an inquiry
anyway. We might expect that an interest against hate-based
claims will be strong enough in most cases to defeat the request
for an accommodation, even if courts must take the reasons for
the request at face value. 127

Id at 604.
See note 241.
125 See Part IV.
126 This is just what Professor Andrew Koppelman urges in the context of opposition
to gay marriage, on the convincing thought that rights to same-sex marriage are now so
widely accepted that those who support them can afford to be magnanimous, at least
assuming that a policy allowing for discrimination against gays is accompanied by features that would lessen the sting for individual gay couples. See generally Andrew
Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S Cal L Rev 619 (2015).
127 One might worry that the role I assign to the state in defending our constitutional values contravenes the neutral stance that a liberal state should occupy. The position
that I am advocating does indeed deviate from a commitment to neutrality, but the deviation is in the service of other, even more foundational values, without which liberalism
would collapse. For a stirring and persuasive defense of this “value democracy,” see generally Brettschneider, How Should Liberal Democracies Respond to Faith-Based Groups
That Advocate Discrimination? (cited in note 118); Corey Brettschneider, When the State
Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote
Equality (Princeton 2012).
123
124
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2. Empirical deference.
In contrast to moral claims, when it comes to factual assertions, we freely adjudicate truth and falsity based on indicia that
receive broad support and that we think the government may
count as authoritative—typically, observation (mediated by
technology, if necessary). 128 It is thus surprising that both the
majority and the dissent in Hobby Lobby announced that assessing the factual—in particular, the scientific—merits of Hobby Lobby’s claim was verboten. 129
As we have seen, the owners refer to the four contested
forms of contraception as “abortifacients”—that is, measures
that have the effect of killing nascent human life. Yet medical
authorities—such as the Institute of Medicine, which identified
the forms of preventive care for women that the ACA should
make available, 130 along with the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and other medical experts—believe that
the drugs do not act directly on the embryo. 131 According to the
medical community, there is a very small possibility that the
contested methods interfere with implantation and, without implantation, the embryo cannot develop. 132 But the general mechanism through which these methods work is by preventing
sperm from fertilizing the egg in the first place, 133 in which case
there is no embryo at all. In short, then, the owners’ objection relies on an understanding of facts with which the medical establishment disagrees. 134
See Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? at 34 (cited in note 34) (“Religious beliefs . . .
are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we
employ in both common sense and in science.”).
129 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778; id at 2798 n 21 (Ginsburg dissenting).
130 See generally Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps (National Academy of Sciences, July 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/34G7-NBKS.
131 Carroll, How Hobby Lobby Ruling Could Limit Access (cited in note 3) (“Research
does not support the idea that [the covered forms of contraception] prevent fertilized
eggs to implant.”); Grossman, What’s Abortifacient? (cited in note 50).
132 See Carroll, How Hobby Lobby Ruling Could Limit Access (cited in note 3) (“Because the doses of medication [in emergency contraception] are very short-term, they
probably cannot affect the uterine lining in such a way as to affect implantation.”).
133 See Fill This Prescription (Scientific American, Sept 24, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/AM4M-U2WN (“By medical definition, the pills block rather than terminate pregnancy.”).
134 See, for example, Anna Glasier, Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 337 New
Eng J Med 1058, 1063 (1997) (“It cannot be stressed too strongly that if hormonal emergency contraception works largely by interfering with ovulation, then it cannot be regarded as an abortifacient.”).
128
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No matter, the majority and dissent maintained, since
courts are not permitted to gauge the “plausibility” of a religious
claim. 135 But surely this position overstates the bounds of deference that are and should be required. Thoroughgoing empirical
deference would commit courts to taking at face value a religious
adherent’s objection to subsidizing blood transfusions because,
say, he believes the donated blood to have come from the devil.136
More generally, so long as the religious adherent’s belief is sincerely held and religiously based, it would establish a presumption in favor of an exemption. The government could rebut that
presumption only in the face of a compelling interest that the
challenged law provides the least restrictive means of serving. 137
During oral argument in another contraceptive-mandate
challenge, Judge Judith Rogers expressed incredulity in response to the claim that courts are hamstrung when it comes to
weighing in on the factual merits of a religious claim. 138 And
commentators contend not only that courts should be permitted

With that said, the factual beliefs propelling the owners are not without any support.
The evidence showing that the four contested methods do not cause embryo destruction
is “not-yet-conclusive.” Jonathan H. Adler, No, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Decision Is Not Based upon a Scientific Mistake (Wash Post, July 6, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/MA48-HCDW. Professor Robin Wilson offers an extended discussion of
the state of scientific knowledge around the mode of operation of these so-called abortifacients. She concludes that the question whether these drugs can prevent implantation “is
simply more complicated than [the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’] blanket assertion suggests,” and she provides a wealth of citations to the writings
of medical professionals to this effect. Wilson, 53 BC L Rev at 1455–59 & nn 140–57
(cited in note 18).
135 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778; id at 2798 n 21 (Ginsburg dissenting).
136 To be clear, this is not the ground on which Jehovah’s Witnesses rest their prohibition against blood transfusions. Instead, they rely on a verse from the Old Testament
prohibiting the ingestion of blood. Leviticus 17:10 (New International Version) (“I will
set my face against any Israelite or any foreigner residing among them who eats blood,
and I will cut them off from the people.”).
137 See notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
138 For an audio recording of the oral argument for this case, Priests for Life v United States Department of Health and Human Services, 772 F3d 229 (DC Cir 2014), see
Oral Argument Recordings (May 8, 2014), online at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/record
ings/recordings.nsf/DocsByRDate?OpenView&count=100&SKey=201405 (visited Nov 7,
2015) (Perma archive unavailable). See also Leslie C. Griffin, A Tractor Is Not a Gun,
Even If You Sincerely Believe It Is (Hamilton and Griffin on Rights, May 18, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/X4DS-W5Z8. Professor Leslie C. Griffin’s blog post reproduces the colloquy between Rogers and the attorney representing Priests for Life, who maintained that the court would have to accept a religious objector’s claim that he was being
asked to produce sheet metal for munitions even if he were mistaken and the sheet
metal was to be used only for farm equipment.

03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE)

1932

The University of Chicago Law Review

12/12/2015 2:32 PM

[82:1897

to assess the factual bases of claims of complicity 139 but also that
they should not grant exemptions when these bases are false.140
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in
particular, counsels against exemptions to providing emergency
contraception when requests for exemptions are “based on unsupported beliefs about [emergency contraception’s] primary
mechanism of action.” 141
The willingness to weigh in on the empirical merits of a religious claim is not undue. Accepting all factual assertions as
true no matter their plausibility would commit us to a life of irrationality. Practical reasoning depends on a grasp not only of
our convictions and aspirations but also of the truth about our
factual circumstances, so that we may successfully apply the
former to the latter. As such, we need a coherent epistemology
from which we can gather certain empirical facts. With that
said, one might contend that factual claims are not so different
from moral claims in this regard. We would surely consign ourselves to a life of irrationality or worse if we granted the truth of
all moral claims—for example, claims like “it is permissible to
kill humans for sport” or “one is morally required to oppress lefthanded individuals.”
There is nonetheless a relevant ground of distinction between empirical and moral claims, which turns on the role of the
state and state institutions in a liberal polity. The liberal state
is committed to neutrality as among different “comprehensive
doctrines.” 142 As such, the state may not weigh in on the truth or
merits of citizens’ moral, religious, or other evaluative beliefs.
On the other hand, states, like individuals, must act, and they
can do so rationally only if they have an accurate grasp of what
the world is like. This is especially true of courts, which function
as finders and triers of fact. There must be some agreed-upon
139 See Griffin, A Tractor Is Not a Gun (cited in note 138) (“The idea that all the federal laws can be challenged by any irrational belief is unprecedented. And that’s a fact.”).
140 See id.
141 Committee on Ethics, The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine *4 (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Nov 2007), archived at
http://perma.cc/DH8Z-323X.
142 Rawls, Political Liberalism at 192–94 (cited in note 115). See also Bruce A.
Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 10–12 (Yale 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Why
Liberals Should Care about Equality, in Ronald Dworkin, ed, A Matter of Principle 205,
205–13 (Harvard 1985) (distinguishing between a liberalism of neutrality and a liberalism of equality and arguing in favor of the latter); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity 125 (Cambridge 1996) (describing neutrality as political liberals understand it
but then cautioning against the use of the term).
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set of standards and methods that allows courts to determine
what facts are true.
Our enlightenment ethos has anointed certain methodologies as truth conferring: observation, the scientific method, certain theoretical constructs, and so on have all been identified as
reliable methods for capturing what the world is like. The state
need not have a role in discovering and promoting moral truth,
and by the lights of some versions of liberalism it should not
have such a role. But it does need to have a role in policing empirical truth, at least in the areas in which it is permitted to
regulate. For example, HHS could not decide what basic health
care should consist of if it did not have a way of apprehending
the way that healthy bodies work and identifying the medical
interventions that are effective in restoring a sick body to
health. Similarly, the Department of Education could not arrive
at a “common core” that is genuinely informative unless it filtered truth from falsehood. In short, there is no state license for
“epistemic abstinence” when it comes to taking cognizance of
empirical facts about the world. 143
Indeed, it is not even clear that there could exist a state that
would be neutral between the claims that empirical evidence
supports and the claims that empirical evidence denies. How
could we ever be in dialogue, let alone cooperate, with individuals who were completely unmoored from empirical reality? 144 In
this regard, it is notable that, even when some religious individuals embrace empirical claims that the scientific establishment
denies, the religious adherents do not outright reject the truthseeking methods of the scientific enterprise (which the liberal
state adopts). Instead, claims contending that, for example,
some methods of FDA-approved contraception function as abortifacients, 145 or claims denying global warming, 146 invoke science
143 I borrow the term “epistemic abstinence” from Professor Joseph Raz, who uses it
in reference to a position that he attributes to Professors John Rawls and Thomas Nagel,
according to which the state may not seek to justify the theory of justice with which it
operates. See generally Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,
19 Phil & Pub Aff 3 (1990).
144 See Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 5–6 (cited in note 142) (identifying the capacity for dialogue as a necessary condition for equal rights).
145 See, for example, Richard M. Doerflinger, The HHS Mandate, Unborn Life, and
the Professionals: A Cog in the Political Machine (The Witherspoon Institute, June 25,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S2RV-D63K.
146 See generally, for example, Roy W. Spencer, Climate Confusion: How Global
Warming Hysteria Leads to Bad Science, Pandering Politicians, and Misguided Policies
That Hurt the Poor (Encounter Books 2008).
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for support. The person who would deny the legitimacy of empirical evidence must either adduce empirical evidence in support
of his position, in which case his efforts would be self-defeating,
or abandon hope of convincing others that he is right. As such, it
is exceedingly difficult to see how such a person could prevail
upon the state to accede to his view. 147
For all these reasons, courts should accord no deference to
empirical claims that are manifestly false. To do otherwise
would be to consign to absurdity not just the parties before the
court but also those whom deference affects. More generally, factual plausibility should indeed be a factor in determining how
much deference a claim of complicity should enjoy. As such, if
the scientific community were to have concluded that the four
contested modes of contraception never interfered with implantation and instead always acted prefertilization, then the Court
would have been justified in rejecting Hobby Lobby’s claim of
complicity, for the conduct to which Hobby Lobby objected ought
not to have constituted a wrong even by the light of its own
moral principle (that is, that destroying an embryo is wrong). 148
With that said, the questions of complicity that Hobby Lobby
raised would not disappear if only we could conclusively establish that the Hobby Lobby owners got the facts wrong, because
other employers challenging the contraceptive mandate object to
all forms of contraception. 149 As such, their claims require that
we address the broader question of when and why we should defer to the complicity claim of one of these employers.
3. Relational deference.
Hobby Lobby’s objection to the four contested contraception
methods turns not only on its understanding of the medical
facts, however far-fetched that understanding may be, but also
147 To put the point another way, the challenge of the radical skeptic would, if taken
seriously, jeopardize far more than just the account advanced here. Indeed, the swath of
propositions that rest at least in part on empirical evidence for their truth or persuasiveness is immense. Most case law and legal scholarship would be debunked if we were
to deem credible the radical skeptic’s view. Given the great weight of agreement on the
other side, the burden of proof lies with him. For these reasons, I set aside concerns
about radical skepticism.
148 I also note that, no matter the legitimacy of Hobby Lobby’s objection to the four
so-called abortifacients, the larger issue—whether employers may exempt themselves
from the contraceptive mandate—would remain for those employers who object on religious grounds to all forms of contraception.
149 See, for example, Gilardi v Sebelius, 926 F Supp 2d 273, 275 (DDC 2013); Newland
v Sebelius, 542 Fed Appx 706, 707–08 (10th Cir 2013).
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on its understanding of when the company or its owners become
complicit in the conduct to which they object. More specifically,
Hobby Lobby contended that its moral and religious convictions
entail that it may not subsidize coverage of the contested contraceptive methods, because subsidization is a form of facilitation,
and it may not facilitate or contribute to another’s wrong or
probable wrong no matter how small the probability of wrongdoing. 150 Its concerns about its own complicity, then, turned not so
much on its assessment of the facts as on a particularly demanding conception of moral purity, as governed by a particularly expansive conception of responsibility. By Hobby Lobby’s lights,
mere facilitation of an act that has even a small potential to involve a wrong causes Hobby Lobby to be morally responsible for
that wrong. 151 Nor is Hobby Lobby alone in subscribing to this
expansive conception of complicity: all employers who object to
the ACA because it provides for health coverage to which the
owners object (for example, the full panoply of contraceptive devices, or vaccinations, blood transfusions, and so forth) worry
that subsidization relates them to the medical treatment they
deem wrong in a way that makes them morally responsible for
that wrong. In general, then, those with conscientious objections
to the contraceptive mandate believe that the threshold for complicity is lower than what law and morality generally take it to
be; for these objectors, a relatively weak connection might be
sufficient to implicate them.
What should we make of their unusually expansive sense of
their own complicity? I have argued that courts should proceed
with great deference when it comes to the moral elements of a
conscientious objector’s complicity claim, but no deference when
the claim’s empirical elements are manifestly false. Relational
claims fall somewhere in between. In this regard, Justice Alito
was right to contend that knowing when one “enabl[es] or
facilitat[es] the commission of an immoral act by another” is a
“difficult and important question.” 152 Thus, some jurists and
scholars contend that these claims should be treated no differently than moral ones, which is to say, with great deference.153
150 See Brief for Respondents, Sebelius v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, Docket No 13-354,
*4–5 (US filed Oct 21, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 5720377).
151 See Gilardi, 926 F Supp 2d at 281–83.
152 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2778.
153 See, for example, Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 565 (Flaum dissenting) (“[B]y putting
substantial pressure on Notre Dame to act in ways that (as the university sees it) involve
the university in the provision of contraceptives, I believe that the accommodation [ ]
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Others maintain that the extent of the implication determines
the substantiality of the burden, and therefore that questions as
to the extent of the connection fall squarely within a court’s purview. 154 Which of these positions should we prefer?
To begin answering that question, note that some relational
claims of complicity are clearly too far-fetched to tolerate. We
would hardly grant an exemption from having to subsidize some
medical treatment because the objector worried that the treatment would cause its recipient to grow horns and a tail. Nor
should our solicitude extend this far. Although causal claims are
metaphysical rather than empirical, 155 there are causal “facts”—
claims of causal connection that, for the purposes of practical
reasoning, we take to be no less true than empirical facts.
Among these facts are what philosopher David Hume calls
“constant conjunctions”—pairs of events in which the first always precedes the second (for example, you flip the switch and
the light turns on). 156 However, the connection between administering the medical treatment in question and the patient’s growing horns and a tail does not even count as a constant conjunction. Indeed, in no instance has anyone grown horns and a tail
after receiving any medical treatment. A rough rule of thumb
might then be the following: assertions of supposed causal connections that have never been documented and for which there is uniform contradictory evidence need not be accorded any deference.
Similarly, we should also reject those relational claims that
amount to pleas that the objector should be less responsible than
standard legal or moral theories would allow. For example, we
should not permit someone who has intentionally facilitated a
crime to evade conviction because he operates with an unusually

runs afoul of RFRA.”) (emphasis added); Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious
Exercises under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate Cases, 99 Va L Rev
Online 10, 16 (2013) (arguing that the fact that a religious employer’s effect on contraceptive use is attenuated—because employees decide whether they will use the method
in question—should be irrelevant for a RFRA analysis, and instead that all that should
be required is that the religious belief be sincerely held).
154 See Part I.B.
155 Notice that we arrive at causal claims on the basis of inductive reasoning: event
B has always followed event A, nature is uniform, and so we should expect future occurrences of A to be followed by B. The constant regularity of “A then B” licenses our conclusion that A causes B. See David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
40–54 (Oxford 1999) (Tom L. Beauchamp, ed).
156 Id at 86. For the view that at least some causal claims are necessarily true,
rather than simply inferred by induction, see generally Ted Honderich, 1 Mind and
Brain: A Theory of Determinism (Oxford 1988).
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narrow conception of complicity—say, one that requires that he
function as a sufficient cause of the crime in order for him to be
found guilty. 157 Even if this narrower conception is mandated by
his religious convictions, our fidelity to the law counsels rejecting it. A person who repudiates the theories of responsibility on
which legal liability turns poses a far greater challenge than the
run-of-the-mill conscientious objector, whose opposition is directed to a discrete set of laws, typically encompassing just a
small area of regulation. The challenge arises because the objection of the former targets modes of liability, and these cut across
numerous legal domains—torts, criminal law, and regulatory violations (everything from traffic laws to environmental and financial regulations), among others. His is an anarchic challenge,
as he effectively attempts to immunize himself from all legal
censure and thereby seeks to be treated as “a law unto himself.” 158 At the same time, he is not completely without respect
for the rule of law—after all, he is seeking an exemption through
legal channels. (Were he to flout even these, there would be
reason to think him unfit for political society.) His exemption
should be denied, again because recognizing his conception of
complicity would place him above the law altogether. 159
But what of the paradigmatic cases of conscientious objection, in which the objector takes himself to be more responsible
than the law would have it? This is just the nature of the claim
at issue in the contraceptive-mandate challenges: there, the religious adherent believes that subsidizing insurance through
which someone else can commit a wrong sufficiently connects
the subsidizer to the wrong to make him complicit. In the next
Part, we will see that that relationship is not one that the law or
standard moral theories recognize as a ground of complicity. One
might think that fidelity to the law should decide the issue here,
157 Such a view would, I presume, rule out accomplice liability altogether; the only
“accomplices” on this view would be coperpetrators. Of course, the defendant who would
seek to prevail on these grounds would have to contend not only that his religion construed complicity more narrowly but also that his religion mandated that he not permit
himself to be subject to a more expansive conception—perhaps on the ground that any
wider sense of responsibility would thwart the freedom that he requires to live out his
individuality, as his religion conceives of it. Though not typically rooted in religion, we
might think of libertarians’ or objectivists’ resistance to positive obligations as residing
along something like these lines. See, for example, Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness:
A New Concept of Egoism 30–35 (Signet 1964).
158 Reynolds v United States, 98 US (8 Otto) 145, 166–67 (1878).
159 See id at 167 (contending that “[g]overnment could exist only in name” if religious adherents were permitted to escape foundational legal tenets).
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just as it does in the case of the person who operates with an
unusually narrow conception of responsibility. But two considerations should give us pause. First, this objector does not pose a
challenge to the rule of law; if anything, he holds himself to a
more demanding standard than the law’s. Second, and on the
other hand, applying our law to him affirms the values underpinning our own conception of complicity—in particular, the
value of individual freedom that functions to keep notions of
complicity within bounds that are believed to be reasonable. And
indeed, if these bounds were entirely reasonable, we would be
right to think that they should prevail. But there is in fact
reason to doubt the cogency of the legal conception of complicity—reason enough to put the religious adherent’s conception on
an equal footing with the law’s. I turn now to surveying the legal
conception, and then I offer a critique of that conception in
Part III.
II. COMPLICITY IN LAW AND ETHICS
In this Part, I argue that the conception of complicity in
standard legal and moral accounts is far narrower than the conception that the mandate opponents wielded. Had the Court applied the law’s conception of complicity in Hobby Lobby, it would
have rejected the owners’ claim. This argument turns on a comparison between paying taxes to fund measures some of which
the taxpayer opposes and paying an insurance company to provide health-care coverage some of which the subsidizer opposes.
I seek to establish here that these two practices are morally on
par. Given that the law declines to recognize tax resistance, I
conclude that, as a matter of applying the law consistently, it
should also decline to recognize challenges to the employer
mandate. Importantly, the claim at issue here is interpretive,
not normative. In Part III, I provide reasons for thinking that
courts should treat both tax resistance and insurance challenges
more deferentially than they currently do. The ambition in this
Part, however, is more modest: I aim to show that the legal conception of complicity and that of the conscientious objectors diverge. It is the idiosyncratic nature of the latter that requires
that courts decide whether to defer to their conception or instead
to insist on the one that the law embodies.
When it comes to conscientious objection, the law distinguishes between direct participation and remote facilitation,
treating the former as compelling and the latter as negligible.
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This can be clearly seen in the case of pacifistic objections to the
military: the law tends to accord an exemption to the pacifist
when he would be made to participate in the war effort, 160 but it
denies an exemption to the pacifist who would withhold the portion of his taxes that would fund military expenditures. 161 By the
lights of the law, participating in a war is recognizably unconscionable for the pacifistic conscript; funding a war is not. 162 In a
similar vein, taxpayers are made to fund capital punishment
and government-subsidized abortions no matter their moral or
religious qualms about one or both of these practices. 163 And similar reasons undergird the rule that students may be compelled
160 The US military recognizes two classes of conscientious objectors: first, those who
oppose only combat; and second, those who oppose all military service. In the event of a
draft, the first class of conscientious objectors will have to serve in the armed forces, but
they will be exempt from all training or duties involving the use of weapons. The second
class will be exempt from all military activity, but they will have to pursue alternative
service (for example, working with the very young or elderly). See generally Fast Facts:
Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service (Selective Service System, Apr 30, 2002),
archived at http://perma.cc/8Q9M-FN2U. It is worth noting that military service, while
perhaps the most familiar locus for successful conscientious objection, is not the only
area in which the law grants exemptions. Religious objectors may be excused from jury
service (when they take seriously the Bible’s prohibition on judging another). See In re
Jenison, 125 NW2d 588, 590 (Minn 1963) (reversing the petitioner’s contempt conviction
for refusing to serve on a jury). Further, laws permitting controversial medical procedures exempt physicians who object to these procedures on moral or religious grounds.
See, for example, 18 Vt Stat Ann § 5285(a) (“A physician, nurse, pharmacist, or other
person shall not be under any duty, by law or contract, to participate in the provision of a
lethal dose of medication to a patient.”).
161 See, for example, Autenrieth v Cullen, 418 F2d 586, 588 (9th Cir 1969) (“The fact
that some persons may object, on religious grounds, to some of the things that the government does is not a basis upon which they can claim a constitutional right not to pay a
part of the tax.”); Lull v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 602 F2d 1166, 1167 (4th Cir
1979); Graves v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 579 F2d 392, 393–94 (6th Cir 1978).
See also United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 260 (1982) (rejecting a religiously based objection to social security taxes on the ground that “religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax”); Schwartzman, 97 Va L Rev at 354
(cited in note 35) (noting that “when [taxpayers’] protests are aimed at general
taxation”—that is, all taxes, and not just those funding a particular initiative that some
taxpayers oppose—then their “First Amendment interests are significantly attenuated,
and the government’s interest in promoting its policies will ordinarily be sufficient to
overcome them”) (emphasis omitted).
162 But see Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (1849), excerpted in Scott J.
Hammond, Kevin R. Hardwick, and Howard L. Lubert, eds, 1 Classics of American Political and Constitutional Thought: Origins through the Civil War 932, 935 (Hackett 2007):

I have heard some of my townsmen say, “I should like to have them order me
out to help put down an insurrection of the slaves, or to march to Mexico;—see
if I would go;” and yet these very men have each, directly by their allegiance,
and so indirectly, at least, by their money, furnished a substitute.
See Zach Carter, Catholic Bishops’ Contraception Coverage Argument Ridiculed by
Pacifist Activists (Huffington Post, Feb 13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/UR9K-UV28.
163
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to pay fees that support university services that they oppose,
like abortion provision or counseling—again, because the objecting
students are considered too remotely connected to those services. 164
Insurance subsidization is like the payment of taxes because
it too relates the subsidizer to the party engaging in the objectionable conduct in an attenuated and mediated way. More specifically, the connection between Hobby Lobby’s contribution to
its employees’ health insurance plans and its employees’ use of
one of the four contested contraceptive methods is not stronger
in a meaningful sense than the connection between a taxpayer’s
contribution to, say, Medicaid and a Medicaid subscriber’s use of
one of these methods. 165 The components of the health-care
package were chosen by the government, just as the expenditures that tax dollars fund are chosen by the government. Further, it is notable that courts have rejected religious objections
to the ACA’s individual mandate because they find the objector’s
connection to the health care that others in the insurance pool
receive to be too attenuated to warrant an exemption. 166 To be
sure, Hobby Lobby pays for a greater proportion of its employees’
health care than any taxpayer pays for a Medicaid subscriber’s
health care (or for the health care of others in the same insurance pool). But brute dollar amounts cannot be said to make a
relevant difference 167—after all, we do not think that wealthy
individuals who pay more taxes are for that reason more implicated by government conduct.
Courts fail to take seriously taxpayer complicity not because
the amount any taxpayer pays to fund some initiative is vanishingly small, but because there are too many steps in the causal
164 See Erzinger v Regents of University of California, 187 Cal Rptr 164, 167–68 (Cal
App 1982).
165 See Sepper, 22 Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L at 329–30 (cited in note 44) (“Doctrine dictates that contributions to insurance fall into a zone of limited responsibility
and, therefore, do not significantly burden religious freedom.”).
166 See, for example, Mead v Holder, 766 F Supp 2d 16, 42 (DDC 2011), affd, SevenSky v Holder, 661 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2011), overruled by National Federation of Independent
Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566 (2012) (“Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts
demonstrating that this conflict is more than a de minimis burden on their Christian
faith.”). This portion of the opinion was affirmed by the DC Circuit. Seven-Sky, 661 F3d
at 5 & n 4. See also Sepper, 22 Am U J Gender, Soc Pol & L at 330 (cited in note 44)
(“Until now, courts have consistently dismissed the burden imposed on religious objectors by insurance programs as both attenuated and justified by compelling government
interests.”).
167 But see Kaemmerling v Lappin, 553 F3d 669, 678 (DC Cir 2008) (“An inconsequential or de minimis burden on religious practice does not rise to th[e] level [of a substantial burden].”).
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chain between the taxpayer’s payment of taxes and the pursuit
of the activity he deplores. For example, in some of the cases involving taxpayer resistance to military spending, the resisting
taxpayer looks at the percentage of the federal budget devoted to
military spending—say, 39 percent in some years 168—and he deducts that amount from his total tax burden, sometimes offering
to contribute that money to a charitable organization unrelated
to war. 169 Thirty-nine percent of a person’s tax burden is not an
insignificant amount. And yet courts do not welcome those
claims for a partial exemption from one’s tax burden any more
than they do other claims, when the amount of money the objector would contribute to the initiative he opposes is considerably
less. Nor should it make a difference under the law that Hobby
Lobby has an interest in its employees’ spiritual standing (their
souls) that is stronger than the taxpayer’s interest in the spiritual standing of his fellow citizens, for this is not the kind of interest of which courts will take cognizance. 170
In sum, given the considerations that the law takes to be
relevant—considerations that turn largely on the proximity between the objector and the conduct to which he objects—there is
no distinction between employer-subsidized health care and
taxpayer-subsidized health care. If taxpayers are taken to be too
remotely connected to the initiatives they fund to count as complicit, then so too employers should be taken to be too remotely
connected to their employees’ contraception use to count as complicit. On the basis of proximity considerations, then, the legal
understanding of complicity would have compelled rejection of
Hobby Lobby’s objections.
Moreover, ethics and law align here. Thus, proximity considerations inform moral judgments as to whether someone is in
fact complicit in conduct that he opposes. For example, in evaluating claims of complicity to participating in the sale of the
morning-after pill, Professor Kent Greenawalt has considered
168 See Anup Shah, World Military Spending (Global Issues, June 30, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/Q9QZ-RNHN.
169 See, for example, Robert T. Pennock, Death and Taxes: On the Justice of Conscientious War Tax Resistance, 1 J Accounting, Ethics & Pub Pol 124, 127–28 (1998).
170 See Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 552 (“[W]hile a religious institution has a broad immunity from being required to engage in acts that violate the tenets of its faith, it has no
right to prevent other institutions, whether the government or a health insurance company, from engaging in acts that merely offend the institution.”); Lyng v Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 US 439, 450–52 (1988); Bowen v Roy, 476
US 693, 699–700 (1986).
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the relative strength of objections raised by the pharmacist, a
drugstore clerk, and a cashier, and he has concluded that
“[t]here comes a point at which an individual’s involvement is so
remote, a right to refuse seems excessive.” 171 Other moral philosophers agree, both with respect to the pharmacist’s case 172 and
with respect to claims of taxpayer complicity. 173
Nor is it surprising that the prevailing conception of complicity among moral philosophers is narrow. Moral philosophical
accounts of responsibility are predominantly individualistic. 174

171 Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They
Be Accommodated?, 9 Ave Maria L Rev 47, 57 (2010). See also id at 60:

I do not think everyone remotely connected to patients, including those who
type their forms, make their beds, dish out their meals, and clean their rooms,
should have a right of conscience to refuse based on the procedure the patient
undergoes. The tie to the objectionable practice is too remote.
172 See, for example, Eva LaFollette and Hugh LaFollette, Private Conscience, Public Acts, 33 J Med Ethics 249, 253 (2007); Robert F. Card, Conscientious Objection and
Emergency Contraception, 7 Am J Bioethics 8, 11 (2007) (“[I]t is simply unreasonable to
withhold medication because of the mere possibility that [assisting patients] may contribute to an immoral result.”).
173 See, for example, Dan W. Brock, Conscientious Refusal by Physicians and Pharmacists: Who Is Obligated to Do What, and Why?, 29 Theoretical Med & Bioethics 187,
197 (2008):

Suppose, as I and many others believe, that thousands of innocent Iraqis have
died unjustly in the Iraq war. Donald Rumsfeld’s complicity in those deaths is
great; senators who voted to authorize President Bush to initiate the war have
complicity that is significant though lesser; ordinary citizens whose tax dollars
help pay for the war have complicity that is minimal at most.
See, for example, Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J Phil 674, 674
(1968) (“[I]n the standard case of responsibility for harm, there can be no liability without contributory fault.”); Kutz, Complicity at 3–7 (cited in note 75) (describing the paradigmatic principle of responsibility in Anglo-American law and ethics as the “individual
difference principle,” which holds that “I am only accountable for a harm if something I
did made a difference to its occurrence,” and arguing, convincingly, that this principle is
gravely in need of supplementation); H.D. Lewis, The Non-moral Notion of Collective Responsibility, in Peter A. French, ed, Individual and Collective Responsibility: Massacre at
My Lai 119, 121 (Cambridge 1972) (“[N]o one can be responsible, in the properly ethical
sense, for the conduct of another.”). Legal accounts also embrace an individualistic conception. See, for example, Mirjan Damaška, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 Am J Comp L 455, 468 (2001) (anointing as sacrosanct “the principle that conviction and sentence for a morally disqualifying crime should be related to the actor’s own
conduct and culpability”); Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability
for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J Intl Crim Just
619, 633 (2007) (“[N]o one, in fact, can be punished for a wrongful act unless the act is
attributable to him.”); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 1–3
(1988) (noting this feature of American jurisprudence and arguing that it reflects only
men’s existential experiences). See also Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for Historical
Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J L & Polit 183, 189 (2006):
174
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Individuals bear responsibility on these accounts only for what
they do, and only to the extent that what they do causes harm. 175
This narrow understanding of responsibility is taken to be a
necessary corollary of liberalism’s commitment to individual
freedom: more-expansive conceptions of responsibility, especially
when these would license blame or sanction, threaten to limit
too much action and therefore to be too restrictive. So it is that
there is a general inclination in the Western philosophical canon
to overlook or even deny claims that an upstream agent can bear
moral responsibility for a downstream event, particularly when
other agents intervene in—and thereby rupture—the causal
chain by interposing their own intentions or decisions. 176 Thus,
on these accounts, a gun seller is not responsible for a gun buyer’s murder of the latter’s nemesis, because the buyer’s decision
to kill functions as an intervening event breaking the causal
chain between the gun sale and the murder. And as we have
seen, commentators and jurists adduce a similar line of argument in the contraceptive-mandate challenges, contending that
an employee’s decision to buy the morning-after pill (or another
form of contraception) eclipses her employer’s responsibility for
her use of contraceptives. 177
Given the role that proximity plays in these cases, it seems
clear that Hobby Lobby’s objection to the contraceptive mandate
fails as a matter of the standard moral and legal understandings
of complicity. 178 Morally, the fact that it is employees who decide
to use contraception would be taken to absolve Hobby Lobby
(and, a fortiori, its owners) of responsibility for that contraceptive use. And legally, the principled rationale for prohibiting
taxpayer resistance 179 would seem to apply with equal force to
[The individualist] conception of responsibility [is one] that American law has
made familiar to us. On this conception, responsibility is limited to the individual’s contribution, and liability may be imposed on an individual only for
her actions, and only to the extent that these wrongfully caused the injury to
be redressed.
See Kutz, Complicity at 3 (cited in note 75).
See Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law at 82–83 (cited in note 72).
177 See, for example, Smith and Corbin, Debate, 161 U Pa L Rev Online at 271 (cited
in note 48); Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2799 (Ginsburg dissenting).
178 See Jay Michaelson, Why Hobby Lobby Will Be Bad for Conservatives (The Daily
Beast, June 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EM2H-PP99 (“[The owners’] causal
nexus is so thin as to be basically nonexistent. [They] can be responsible for anything.”).
179 There is, of course, an administrative rationale for prohibiting tax resistance: the
tax system as a whole would falter if taxpayers could opt out of paying taxes for any initiative that they opposed. But that rationale is not decisive. Courts routinely invoke
175
176
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pleas for religiously based exemptions from mandatory insurance subsidization.
Before moving on, it is worth underscoring that the claim in
this Part has been conditional in two respects. First, the deliberations here have been aimed at showing how Hobby Lobby
would have come out if the Court had applied the understanding
of complicity contained in the law (which itself follows the understanding in standard moral accounts), rather than the more
capacious understanding of complicity that the owners advanced. We have seen that, under the legal understanding of
complicity, Hobby Lobby’s connection to the asserted wrong
would be too tenuous to render it complicit in “embryo destruction” simply on the basis of providing health insurance that included so-called abortifacients. Nor would the result have been
different had Hobby Lobby instead opposed all methods of contraception, or different medical interventions altogether (for example, blood transfusions, treatments derived from embryonic
stem cells, and so forth). The relevant considerations contemplate not how much health care the objecting subsidizer funds but
how strong the connection is between the objecting subsidizer and
the conduct that he opposes. Again, given the law’s fixation on
proximity, the connection created by the employer mandate
would not be deemed strong enough.
The claim that I defend is conditional in a second sense, as
well: if proximity is relevant to determining when courts should
grant exemptions, then the mandate cases should be decided no
differently from the tax-resistance cases. In the next Part, I take
issue with the role that proximity plays in law and ethics and
thereby seek to show that the antecedent in this second conditional is problematic.
III. THE TROUBLING ROLE OF PROXIMITY IN COMPLICITY
DETERMINATIONS
Our standard thinking about complicity, in both law and
ethics, relies to a significant extent on considerations of proximity for purposes of distinguishing among different complicity
claims on the basis of their strength. In this Part, I aim to establish that proximity does indeed play this role and to argue that
it is a misleading guide when it comes to conscientious objection.
concerns about attenuation in justifying their decisions to deny tax relief on conscientious grounds. See notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
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Part III.A contains the argument for the claim that proximity
does a good deal of work in the adjudication of complicity claims
in both ethics and the law. In Part III.B, I ascertain what is
really at stake for the conscientious objector: Why is participation in an act that he opposes so difficult for him? I contend that
the fact of our agency does make a difference to us; we do not
want to be connected to an act we deem wrong, even if our connection is compelled by law and even if the outcome will be the
same whether or not we participate. Yet concerns for our own
implication can be—reasonably—insensitive to degree: even
when there may, in some cases, be good reasons to see oneself as
more or less implicated in an act given the strength of one’s
causal connection to it, there may, in other cases, be good
reasons to overlook proximity considerations, as I argue in Part
III.C. In Part III.D, I apply the insights of the previous sections
to the employer-mandate case and I argue that, given the
amount of deference that complicity claims deserve, considerations of proximity underdetermine the proper response to requests for exemptions. We shall see that we are without the
resources to arrive at fine and firm distinctions among different
claims of complicity. I conclude that if we are to decide which of
these claims the law should recognize, we will have to look
beyond the merits of a given complicity claim and instead to the
effects of an exemption on others.
A. Proximity as the Prevailing Criterion for Conscientious
Objection
We have seen that courts generally reject claims of conscientious objection to particular tax expenditures. 180 The rationale
for denying citizens a right to opt out of paying the portion of
their taxes funding initiatives to which they object is, in part,
avowedly administrative—the whole tax system would falter if
the government were made to carve out exceptions to the myriad
governmental expenditures that some individual or another
opposes on moral or religious grounds. 181 As the Court has noted,
180 The exception here arises in cases in which the contested government expenditure would constitute an Establishment Clause violation. See Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83,
104 (1968) (noting that the “Establishment Clause . . . operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power”).
181 See United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 260 (1982) (contending that the “tax system
could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief”); Autenrieth v
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“the proper and efficient exercise of [the tax function] may sometimes entail the possibility of encroachment upon individual
freedom.” 182 The Court has also expressed separation of powers
concerns, rejecting the objecting taxpayers’ claims not on the
merits but rather on standing grounds. 183 And scholars adduce
another principled rationale for denying taxpayers a right to
withhold taxes that would fund initiatives that they find objectionable: these expenditures, like all government expenditures,
result from established democratic means. 184 Today’s tax levies
do not involve “taxation without representation”; 185 instead, it is
“our own duly elected governmental officials who imposed these
taxes.” 186 Put differently, what it means to live in a democracy is
to recognize that one’s policy preferences will not always prevail,
and that one is under an obligation to obey the law even if one’s
preferences have not prevailed. 187
Yet while all these considerations provide a partial explanation for the law’s refusal to countenance conscientious taxpayer
resistance, they do not—either alone or in combination—fully
account for that refusal. The law already permits taxpayers to
Cullen, 418 F2d 586, 588–89 (9th Cir 1969) (“If every citizen could refuse to pay all or
part of his taxes because he disapproved of the government’s use of the money, on religious grounds, the ability of the government to function could be impaired or even
destroyed.”).
182 Bates v City of Little Rock, 361 US 516, 524–25 (1960). See also Kornhauser,
1999 Wis L Rev at 972 (cited in note 6).
183 See, for example, Flast, 392 US at 114 (Stewart concurring) (“[A] taxpayer may
not ‘employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about
the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.’”); United
States v Richardson, 418 US 166, 177 (1974); Ex parte Levitt, 302 US 633, 633–34 (1937);
Massachusetts v Mellon, 262 US 447, 487 (1923).
184 See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith,
494 US 872, 890 (1990):
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must
be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of
all religious beliefs.
185 Pennock, 1 J Accounting, Ethics & Pub Pol at 132 (cited in note 169) (raising this
argument as a hypothetical objection to his own position, which is that conscientious objection to war taxes should be permissible). See also generally Moody-Adams, Democratic
Conflict (cited in note 113).
186 Pennock, 1 J Accounting, Ethics & Pub Pol at 132 (cited in note 169).
187 See Sullivan, 59 U Chi L Rev at 222 (cited in note 15) (“[W]hile financial support
is withdrawn from religion, religionists may still be required to give financial support to
the state, for all religions gain from the truce and the common goods of the civil public
order it established.”).
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contest government expenditures that violate constitutional constraints on government activity, most notably in the Establishment
Clause context. 188 If the tax system can withstand these challenges,
then it can presumably withstand at least some others, too. 189 Similarly, if courts are equipped to weigh the merits of tax objections in the Establishment Clause context, then surely they can
weigh the merits of at least some other tax objections, too—
especially those that are based on conscience and thus are not
“generalized grievances” 190 or injuries that are “indefinite [and
held] in common with people generally.” 191 Finally, the fact that
the contested government expenditures were chosen through
legitimate democratic means fails as a justification for similar
reasons, because exemptions are granted for other government
measures whose democratic pedigrees are no less venerable. For
example, the pacifist who seeks an exemption from the draft
lodges an objection to a war effort that Congress authorized.
The consideration that tips the scale against most cases of
taxpayer resistance, then, must lie elsewhere—namely, in considerations of the proximity between the objector’s conduct and
the result or activity to which he objects. Thus, as we have seen,
the connection between taxpayers and the government initiatives they oppose has been deemed too remote or attenuated to
warrant an exemption. 192 And remoteness here is not simply a
factor bearing on the justiciability of the complaint. 193 It is instead a finding on the merits that the burden on the taxpayer is
too negligible or too far removed from an activity that is important to the adherent’s religious scheme. 194
Moreover, considerations of proximity underpin not only the
differential treatment accorded to pacifistic military conscripts
and tax resisters but other complicity determinations as well.
See Flast, 392 US at 102–03 (establishing a two-part test whereby a plaintiff can
establish standing to sue the government for an unconstitutional use of taxpayer funds).
189 To soften the blow, the government could mandate that the objecting taxpayers
direct the portion of their taxes that would have gone to the objectionable activity to
some other initiative, like the Peace Corps or Head Start. See Pennock, 1 J Accounting,
Ethics & Pub Pol at 141 & n 34 (cited in note 169).
190 Flast, 392 US at 106.
191 Mellon, 262 US at 488.
192 See note 161 and accompanying text.
193 See Mellon, 262 US at 487 (“[A]ny payment out of the funds [is] so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of
a court of equity.”).
194 See Kaemmerling v Lappin, 553 F3d 669, 678 (DC Cir 2008) (denying a claim on
the ground that the burden on the objector was “de minimis”).
188
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Thus, proximity explains law and morality’s greater tolerance
for physicians who assist suicide (legal in some states) relative
to those who engage in euthanasia (illegal in all states), as well
as the greater protection afforded to pharmacists who refuse to
fill prescriptions for the morning-after pill but not to pharmacy
clerks who refuse to ring up the bill for customers waiting to
pick up their morning-after pill prescriptions. 195 Yet it is not
clear that considerations of proximity are relevant to the objector, nor that they should be, as I now endeavor to show.
B. The Grounds of Conscientious Objection
I begin with a relatively uncontroversial case of conscientious objection—that of the physician who refuses to perform
abortions on moral or religious grounds. Doctors who object to
abortion on moral or religious grounds may, without penalty, refuse to perform abortions. This is a well-established right of
physicians, 196 and it is met with virtually no objection on the
part of the public. Yet notwithstanding the widespread
acceptance of conscientious objection in the case of abortion provision, 197 it is surprisingly difficult to identify or articulate the rationale for accommodating the physician’s objection. Especially if
we know that the outcome will be the same no matter whether
the objecting physician participates (if he will not, the patient
can find another provider who will) and especially given that
doctors bear a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their

195

See Wilson, 53 BC L Rev at 1465–66 (cited in note 18):

In the health care context, an Iowa Attorney General Opinion concluded that
the state’s abortion conscience clause extended by its terms only to those who
“recommend[ ], perform[ ], or assist[ ] in an abortion procedure.” Consequently,
nurses who provide comfort to a patient and pharmacists who prepare the saline solution used in abortions could not use the conscience clause to refrain
from doing their jobs.
196 See Sepper, 98 Va L Rev at 1503 (cited in note 45); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal
Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J Clinical Ethics 163, 165 &
n 38 (2010) (collecting laws from states that permit doctors to refuse to perform abortions
on moral or religious grounds); State Policies in Brief: Refusing to Provide Health Services
*3 (Guttmacher Institute, Nov 1, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T5C5-SYEL (same).
197 I assume that the situation is not one in which the woman faces an imminent
threat to her health or life such that she would not have time to find another doctor if
the first one refused. See Committee on Ethics, The Limits of Conscientious Refusal at *1
(cited in note 141) (“In an emergency in which referral is not possible or might negatively
have an impact on a patient’s physical or mental health, providers have an obligation to
provide medically indicated and requested care.”).
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patients, 198 why permit the physician to refuse? Why not just
think the objecting physician’s concern precious and, worse still,
violative of the commitment to his patient’s welfare that forms
the backbone of his profession? 199
The answer, it turns out, depends on the special value that
each of us attaches to our own agency. In general, it is a moral
commonplace that no one should be made to participate in an
act that he deems immoral. We safeguard people from such participation because we recognize that, from the perspective of the
actor, it makes a difference that the wrong occurs through his
hands, even if he knows that the wrong will occur whether or
not it is he who brings it about.
The interest at stake for an individual in keeping his own
hands clean can be understood in several ways. On a narrative
account, the idea might be that one has an interest in having a
life story that does not include an episode in which one acted
against one’s convictions. 200 The notion of moral integrity and its
role in constituting one’s identity might also capture what is at
stake. 201 Thus, Professor Dan Brock writes:
198 In general, a fiduciary must “promote the interests of [the] beneficiar[y] rather
than [the fiduciary’s] own interests.” Sharona Hoffman and Jessica Wilen Berg, The
Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U Pitt L Rev 365, 393 (2005). The doctor is a fiduciary to
his patients. See Thomas L. Hafemeister and Richard M. Gulbrandsen Jr, The Fiduciary
Obligation of Physicians to “Just Say No” If an “Informed” Patient Demands Services
That Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 Seton Hall L Rev 335, 369 & nn 171–72 (2009) (collecting cases in which courts have noted that the physician bears a fiduciary relationship
to his patients).
199 See Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual: Sixth Edition,
156 Annals Internal Med 73, 75 (2012) (“The physician’s primary commitment must always be to the patient’s welfare and best interests.”).
200 This idea is given a powerful evocation in a hypothetical that might seem far
afield of the example here—namely, one in which a lorry driver hits and kills a child
through no fault of the driver’s. See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck 27–30 (Cambridge
1981). Given that the driver is not responsible for the accident, one might expect his reaction to the child’s death to be no different from that of an onlooker who witnesses the
scene. Not so, however, Professor Bernard Williams explains: the driver’s agency has
been implicated in the death in a way that the bystander’s has not. Id at 30. The driver’s
biography has been punctuated by this tragic event—it figures in the narrative of his life
in a way different from the way that it will figure in the life of a mere bystander to the
event. For this reason, in addition to caring about the child’s fate, the driver has reason
to care that it was he who brought about this fate. See Susan Wolf, The Moral of Moral
Luck, 31 Philosophic Exchange 4, 9 (2001) (“What is problematic is [the lorry driver’s]
failure . . . to take the consequences of his faultiness to have consequences for him, to be
a significant part of his personal history, in a way in which witnessing, much less reading about an accident would not be.”).
201 See Sepper, 98 Va L Rev at 1529 (cited in note 45) (“[A] number of scholars have
argued [that] an individual’s moral integrity offers the most compelling moral basis for
respecting her conscience.”); Chapman, 2013 U Ill L Rev at 1494 (cited in note 114) (“[A]s
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Deeply held and important moral judgments of conscience
constitute the central bases of individuals’ moral integrity;
they define who, at least morally speaking, the individual is,
what she stands for, what is the central moral core of her
character. Maintaining her moral integrity then requires
that she not violate her moral commitments and gives others reason to respect her doing so . . . because the maintenance of moral integrity is an important value, central to
one’s status as a moral person. 202
Or, again, in a more existentialist vein, one might say that one
is what one does, and one’s actions instantiate one’s values in
the world and so stand as beacons for others in discerning right
from wrong. 203 At bottom, all these understandings are about
meaning—how we construct meaning for and about ourselves in
light of what we do in the world. 204
Notice, though, that once we locate the reason to grant an
accommodation to others in a quest for meaning, it becomes
difficult to judge some assertions of complicity to be more or less
legitimate than others. From a first person perspective, other
factors may occlude proximity considerations in determining
many theorists have noted, protecting conscience promotes obedience to conscience,
which in turn promotes personal integrity.”). For statements of conscience that speak to
personal integrity, see Hannah Arendt, 1 The Life of the Mind: Thinking 181 (Harcourt
Brace 1978) (quoting Socrates’s explanation for his civil disobedience: “It would be better
. . . that multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should
be out of harmony with myself and contradict me”); Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird
105 (Warner Books 1960) (quoting Atticus Finch as saying, “before I can live with other
folks I’ve got to live with myself ”) (emphasis added). See also Rawls, Political Liberalism
at 312–13 (cited in note 115) (defending “liberty of conscience” in light of its relationship
to our conception of the good, which includes a sense of self-awareness—we come to
know “why . . . our ends [are] good and suitable for us”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of
Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality 19 (Basic Books 2008)
(referring to conscience as the “faculty in human beings with which they search for life’s
ultimate meaning”).
202 Brock, 29 Theoretical Med & Bioethics at 189 (cited in note 173). See also J.
David Bleich, The Physician as a Conscientious Objector, 30 Fordham Urban L J 245, 245
(2002) (“[T]o demand of a physician that she act in a manner she deems to be morally
unpalatable not only compromises the physician’s ethical integrity, but is also likely to
have a corrosive effect upon the dedication and zeal with which she ministers to
patients.”).
203 See Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism 20–23 (Yale 2007) (John
Kulka, ed) (Carol Macomber, trans).
204 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hobby Lobby supports the relationship
between conscience and meaning, although his comments are restricted to religious freedom rather than freedom of conscience more generally. Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2785
(Kennedy concurring) (“For [religious adherents], free exercise is essential in preserving
their own dignity and in striving for a self-definition shaped by their religious precepts.”).
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how complicit a person feels or even has reason to feel. Or so I
shall now argue, by examining cases in which proximity is a
poor guide for discerning the magnitude of one’s responsibility
for someone else’s conduct to which one contributes.
C. Proximity versus First Person Perceptions of Complicity
Law and morality agree that it is worse for a doctor to kill a
patient than for a doctor to give the patient the means to kill
himself (typically, with a lethal dose of medicine that the patient
self-administers). That is, euthanasia is taken to be worse than
physician-assisted suicide (PAS). 205 It is for this reason that PAS
is legal in some states whereas euthanasia is illegal everywhere. 206 On what do these judgments rest?
According to some commentators, proximity makes the relevant difference. 207 Yet much of the greater concern that euthanasia invites results from considerations that bear only a contingent connection to proximity. Instead, these are better cashed
out as concerns for patient autonomy, and proximity is but a
rough proxy for them. For example, we have reason to prefer
PAS to euthanasia because it elides the worry that perhaps the
patient was coerced, or that he had a change of heart that he
was unable to communicate in time. 208 If he self-administers the
lethal drugs, we have greater reason to think that he was committed to ending his life. 209 The question for our purposes,

205 See Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 732–33 (1997) (noting that one of the reasons for prohibiting PAS is that legalized PAS could open the door to legalized euthanasia).
206 See, for example, The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or Rev Stat § 127.800
et seq.
207 See, for example, Timothy E. Quill, Christine K. Cassel, and Diane E. Meier,
Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327
New Eng J Med 1380, 1381 (1992); Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs
Amok, 22 Hastings Center Rep 52, 52 (Mar–Apr 1992) (arguing that euthanasia, unlike
suicide, cannot be seen as an exercise of self-determination since euthanasia has someone else do the killing, and contending further that no one else can have the right to kill
another, even with the other’s consent).
208 See Willem A. Landman, A Proposal for Legalizing Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in South Africa, in Loretta M. Kopelman and Kenneth A. De Ville, eds, PhysicianAssisted Suicide: What Are the Issues? 203, 211 (Kluwer Academic 2001). See also Glucksberg,
521 US at 730–31 (describing the ways in which our certitude about the patient’s commitment to ending his life might be undermined—for example, because he has not been adequately treated for pain or because he is in a vulnerable position).
209 But see generally Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: PhysicianAssisted Suicide and Euthanasia, in Susan M. Wolf, ed, Feminism & Bioethics: Beyond
Reproduction 282 (Oxford 1996) (arguing that, given the social and cultural norms celebrating or mandating self-sacrifice on the part of women, we have reason to doubt the
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however, is whether there is an intrinsic moral difference between the two practices, not whether one is more likely to raise
concerns in practice. 210 Suppose that one could be confident that
the patient in the euthanasia scenario is as committed to ending
his life as the patient in the PAS scenario. Does the fact that euthanasia has the physician administer the lethal medicine
whereas PAS has the patient do so give the physician more
reason to feel complicit in the former than the latter?
One might think that a distinction between the two exists
because, with euthanasia, the physician intends her patient’s
death whereas in PAS the physician need intend only to facilitate her patient’s choice to die. 211 But that way of describing the
two practices is tendentious. The physician who offers euthanasia
may intend only to facilitate her patient’s choice to die, too, and
the physician who prescribes lethal medication that the patient
will self-administer may intend by so doing to participate in
bringing about her patient’s death. Given that the intention underlying euthanasia and PAS may be the same, the difference
between the two may then simply be one of means.
This difference in means cannot sustain a moral distinction
between the two practices. To see this, consider a stylized version of the ways that euthanasia and PAS occur. Suppose that
death in both occurs as a result of a lethal combination of medicines that is administered through injection (euthanasia) or
orally (PAS). Whichever route the patient chooses, his death will
occur in the doctor’s office—either the doctor will administer the
conviction of a gravely ill woman who professes to want to end her life, whether through
euthanasia or PAS).
210 Those who consider the question from a utilitarian perspective will not recognize
a difference between a practice’s practical consequences and its intrinsic moral status.
Compare Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary
Euthanasia, in John Keown, ed, Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives 225, 228–33 (Cambridge 1995) (suggesting that there is no difference between
euthanasia and PAS on practical grounds), with John Deigh, Physician-Assisted Suicide
and Voluntary Euthanasia: Some Relevant Differences, 88 J Crim L & Crimin 1155,
1164–65 (1998) (concluding that “utilitarian methods advise treating the two practices
separately”).
211 See Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793, 802 (1997), quoting Assisted Suicide in the United
States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 367 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) (“[I]n
some cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a patient’s death, but the physician’s purpose
and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient’s pain. A doctor who assists a suicide,
however, ‘must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made
dead.’”). For an extended discussion of the difficulty in distinguishing, on moral grounds,
an intention to omit treatment from acts of hastening death, see Sepper, 98 Va L Rev at
1536–38 (cited in note 45).
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injection in her office or she will hand the patient the pills and
he will take them in her office. (The example is stylized because,
with PAS, the physician provides the patient with a prescription
for the lethal drugs, and the patient fills the prescription and
then typically ingests the pills at home.) 212 Arguably, at least,
the injection has the physician participate more directly in the
patient’s death than does the provision of the pills. But surely
there can be no moral difference that turns on the difference in
the method by which the lethal drugs enter the patient’s body. 213
The physician is not more morally implicated in the death when
she administers a lethal injection that kills her patient than
when she hands over the lethal pills and simply watches as the
patient kills himself. (The same would hold true if what were at
stake were a distinction between surgical and medical (that is,
drug-induced) abortions in which either procedure took place in
the doctor’s office with the doctor at the patient’s side.)
Yet if there is no reason to distinguish morally between the
euthanasia and PAS cases in the stylized versions just described, why should we think that a distinction exists between
euthanasia and PAS as the two typically occur—that is, with the
former taking place in the doctor’s office, and the latter occurring sometime after the doctor prescribes the lethal medications
and in the doctor’s absence? The decision to end his life is no
more the patient’s when it is effectuated in his home than when
it is effectuated in the doctor’s office. Yet in the case in which
the patient ingests the lethal drugs at home, the doctor is undoubtedly more removed—in space and time—from the patient’s
death than she is in the euthanasia case. If the fact of greater
distance in space and time does not entail a diminution in the
physician’s moral responsibility—and for the foregoing reasons,
I believe that it does not—then it must be that what matters in
our thinking about any moral differences between euthanasia
and PAS is not the extent of the doctor’s intervention in the patient’s death so much as it is the other concerns for which causal
proximity might function as a proxy (for example, concerns

212 See Daniel Engber, How Does Assisted Suicide Work? (Slate, Oct 6, 2005),
archived at http://perma.cc/D9MN-3XP5.
213 See John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy: An Argument against
Legalisation 33 (Cambridge 2002) (“What, for example, is the supposed difference
between a doctor handing a lethal pill to a patient; placing the pill on the patient’s
tongue; and dropping it down the patient’s throat?”).
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about whether the patient persists in his intent to die or whether he has been pressured). 214
What, then, of the pharmacist who objects to filling a prescription for PAS? The pharmacist is situated differently from
the physician: Doctor and patient share responsibility for the
patient’s treatment choices, as physician and patient are appropriately regarded as a team. The doctor is not some mere commercial purveyor and the patient does not merely play the role
of consumer. Instead, doctor and patient decide together, in consultation, on the best course of action for the patient. 215 As such,
the doctor is aligned with the patient’s treatment choices in a
way that the pharmacist is not. 216 Instead, the pharmacist who
is handed a prescription for a lethal dose of medicine because
the patient has elected, and has been certified for, 217 PAS is like
the gun merchant who is asked to sell a gun to someone who intends to kill himself with it and who—let us imagine, for the
purpose of more closely aligning the pharmacist and gunmerchant
cases—is also terminally ill and has also been certified for PAS.
(Imagine further that the terminally ill gun buyer who intends
to end his life prefers the drama of a gunshot to lethal sedation.)
Both the pharmacist and gun merchant in these scenarios provide their customers with instruments that they know the customer intends to use to end his life. And as a brute causal matter, it may well be that the physician prescribing the lethal
medication for PAS is not so differently situated from either the
pharmacist or the gun merchant. Determining the strength of a
causal connection for legal purposes is a matter for both

214 But see Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 Hastings Center Rep 10,
10 (Mar–Apr 1992) (“If there is no significant, intrinsic moral difference between the
two, it is also difficult to see why public or legal policy should permit one but not the
other; worries about abuse or about giving anyone dominion over the lives of others apply equally to either.”).
215 See Timothy E. Quill and Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and
Patient Autonomy: Finding a Balance between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125
Annals Internal Med 763, 765 (1996) (advocating “enhanced autonomy,” a decisionmaking
model in which physicians share their expertise and patients and physicians deliberate
together about the best course of treatment).
216 This alignment explains why physicians and terminally ill patients together
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Washington’s and New York’s statutes
prohibiting PAS. See generally Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (challenging Washington’s statute);
Quill, 521 US 793 (challenging New York’s statute).
217 See Engber, How Does Assisted Suicide Work? (cited in note 212) (describing the
process for having physicians authorize PAS).
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normative and metaphysical judgment. 218 But the physician has
reason to feel implicated over and above the extent of her causal
role—again, as part of the team that decided on the course of
treatment, the doctor is aligned with the patient’s ends in a way
that the pharmacist is not. The physician is a participant in the
patient’s care whereas the pharmacist is a detached facilitator of
it. For that reason, the physician has reason to feel more implicated in PAS than the pharmacist does.
Now compare the pharmacist to the pharmacy clerk who
hands the vial to the patient, or the cashier who rings up the patient. Assume that all three employees know the contents of the
vial. On the basis of the features typically salient to us, the
pharmacist is more directly involved than the other two—the
pharmacist acts with greater specificity toward the patient’s
end. The clerk and cashier can proceed mindlessly, but the
pharmacist must focus her attention on providing the patient
with the drugs that will arm him with the means to take his life.
And the pharmacist may feel more implicated in light of her professional training, too: “Today I used my expertise to give someone drugs that he will use to kill himself” is a plausible thought
for her to have. For these reasons, it would be understandable if
she were to see herself as more bound up in the patient’s suicide
than either the clerk or cashier would. But the fact that her own
role would seem more salient to her than the clerk’s or cashier’s
roles would seem to either of them does not mean that the
pharmacist is in fact more complicit than these other two drugstore employees. From a disinterested standpoint, the pharmacist is just doing her job, just as the clerk and cashier are doing
their jobs. 219 The fact that the pharmacist cannot ignore her

See Moore, Causation and Responsibility at 278–79 (cited in note 72) (contending
that the law’s conception of causation is stylized and based largely on the ends that the
law seeks to serve rather than on any genuine metaphysical truths).
219 There is a well-known case in European criminal law theory involving a waiter
who serves a dish that she knows to be poisonous to a customer without alerting the customer to the lethal danger he now faces. See Luis E. Chiesa, The Evil Waiter Case, 69 U
Miami L Rev 161, 162–63 (2014). The waiter is not responsible for the presence of the
poison, and, according to European systems, she will not be held responsible for the customer’s death notwithstanding her failure to warn. The waiter’s job was to deliver the
dish, and she is relieved of responsibility for the death because she did what her job
commanded. Many of us would find the European stance overly permissive—surely the
waiter bears some responsibility for the death, and the law ought to track that responsibility. But the pharmacist’s case is distinguishable, at any rate, because the patient knows
(and indeed intends) that the drugs she is giving the patient will cause his demise.
218
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contribution as readily as the clerk or cashier can does not make
her more responsible; it just makes her feel more responsible.
Drilling down on these scenarios and the roles that various
individuals play in them reveals the following insight: many assertions of complicity appear far more compelling from a first
person, rather than third person, perspective. This is unsurprising given the relationship between conscience and identity. 220 I
have more reason to care about some state of affairs when it is I
who has brought it about. And proximity can function as a proxy
for other considerations that are relevant, too. For example, the
person who purposely contributes to A will often want to ensure
A’s successful completion, and so may involve himself more. It is
not, then, his proximity that does the work of rendering him
more responsible, but instead his greater commitment or sense
of purpose.
It is good that we feel more implicated in acts in which we
have played a greater causal role. We have more power to ensure that these acts do not happen or that they happen in a better way than they might have otherwise, and feeling more implicated may well provide us with greater motivation to prevent
these acts or to modify them for the better. But the point here is
that this stronger feeling of implication need not reflect, and indeed may well exceed, the genuine extent of one’s complicity. 221
In other words, one might feel more morally responsible for conduct to which one bears a closer causal connection even though
it would be unreasonable for anyone else to judge one more morally responsible solely on that basis.
On the other hand, it is also generally good if we feel implicated in acts to which our connections are remote. A person who
places a premium on his moral purity will feel responsible for
his contributions to wrongs or harms that most of us ignore. As
such, he will constrain his conduct at the expense of freedoms
that the rest of us claim as our right, restricting his purchases,
carbon footprint, food choices, practices at work, relationships
with others, and so forth, in the service of dissociating himself
from conduct that he deems wrongful. The effect is, in general,
to lessen harm in the world. To be sure, the tendency that he
exhibits is not always morally desirable—extreme versions of
this posture can reflect narcissism or neuroticism or moral

220
221

See notes 200–04 and accompanying text.
See Schwartzman, 97 Va L Rev at 376–77 (cited in note 35).

03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Conscience and Complicity

12/12/2015 2:32 PM

1957

fetishism. But, in general, holding oneself to an unusually high
moral standard is rightly taken to be a mark of virtue, not psychological pathology.
All of this suggests that the factors that determine the
magnitude of an individual’s responsibility when judged by an
impartial observer need not coincide with those that are salient
from a first person perspective. Thus, a person’s sense of his own
complicity may be greater or less than we would judge it to be. 222
More specifically, his own sense may depend on factors that are,
again, from an impartial perspective, morally irrelevant but—
from the perspective of the person making the contributions—
not so readily dismissed. If his contribution claims more of his
attention or strikes more acutely at his sense of self, he will feel
himself to be more responsible than we, impartial observers,
would judge him to be. Sometimes, we should respond to this divergence by seeking to bring him around to our way of seeing
the matter. But sometimes we should not: as I have said, his
heightened moral sensitivity is sometimes salutary and oftentimes laudable for its own sake. And, in any event, because his
assessment is connected to his self-conception, we should be
wary of trying to dissuade him, on the worry that doing so will
interfere with his sense of self. For example, the pharmacist’s
sense of what it is to be a pharmacist, or her conception of the
kind of pharmacist she wants to be, might include a prohibition
on using her skills to dispense medications that aim to end
human life. Even if we would not judge her responsible in any
measure were she to fill a prescription for PAS, she might think
222 In the text that follows, I contemplate the way that we should treat first person
assessments of responsibility only when the person judges himself more harshly than an
impartial observer would. The case in which someone judges himself less harshly can
give rise to two points of divergence in practice: First, this more lax judge may decide
that he is not sufficiently implicated in the conduct that he deems wrong to seek an exemption. As such, questions whether to grant him conscientious objector status do not
arise. Second, this more lax judge may recognize that he bears no more responsibility
than we would ascribe to him, but he might nonetheless think that even the (relatively
little) responsibility he bears is more than his personal morality can handle. Thus, he
might seek an exemption even though he would think the magnitude of his responsibility
less than we would think it. I do not see that there is any difference between this case
and the one in which the objector judges himself to be more responsible because he
thinks that he is meaningfully connected to some harm, even though we think that his
contribution is negligible. At the end of the day, both objectors find their connections to
the wrong intolerable—one because he sees his causal role as greater than we see it, and
the other because he sees the magnitude of his causal role accurately but positions the
threshold for complicity lower on the spectrum than we do. In both cases, then, deference
is in order for the reasons that I adduce in the text above.

03 SEPINWALL_ART_SA (SD) (DO NOT DELETE)

1958

The University of Chicago Law Review

12/12/2015 2:32 PM

[82:1897

her own contribution abominable. And her thought here is not
wrong, even if it is different from our own. In matters of professional or personal identity, individuals should be given some latitude to forge meaning and set boundaries for themselves (at
least when those boundaries are stricter than those that professional, moral, or legal norms require).
The very same factors that favor conscientious objection in
cases of direct participation (as in the draft) also favor deference
when it comes to a person’s heightened sense of his own complicity: Being made to contribute to conduct that one opposes is
painful because it entails a dislocation from the self. So too being
told that one has overly grand ideas about his professional identity or his personal agency can be painful, because these ideas
constitute one’s sense of self in important ways. Given the pain of
betraying one’s sense of self, then, we should treat first person assessments of complicity with solicitude—at least presumptively.
That is, all else equal, we should deem a complicity claim compelling if the objector deems it so, and independent of the kind of
contribution to the asserted wrong that it entails. Whether facilitation through insurance subsidization is morally troubling
enough to count as complicity should then turn on only whether
the objector believes that it is.
D. Morally Mandated Indifference to Proximity
This leaves us with a problem: On an account that grounds
a conscientious exemption in the objector’s interest in not having
his agency implicated in what he perceives as a wrong, there is
no reason not to take the objector’s concerns at face value. It is
his sense of meaning that is at stake and so we should defer to
his understanding of the circumstances that make him complicit.
Who are we to say that he is being overly sensitive or stringent
when it comes to his own moral purity? On this way of proceeding, we are without the resources to distinguish among assertions of complicity on the basis of their strength. In particular, if
we must accept assertions of complicity at face value, then we
may not accord them more or less weight on the ground that
complicity itself is, in Anglo-American law, a scalar concept whose
magnitude turns at least in part on the actor’s causal proximity to
the act in which he is (or takes himself to be) morally implicated.
And yet as a practical matter, we cannot defer to every sincere claim of complicity and exempt the person who would see
himself as complicit from the conduct to which he objects in every
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instance in which a complicity claim is raised. Two considerations, which I explore in the next Part, provide counterweights
against a claim of complicity. First, we must consider whether
the grant of an exemption would impose costs on third parties
and, if so, the magnitude of these costs. Second, we must bring
to bear the insights culled from the three kinds of deference we
discussed earlier and use them to evaluate how compelling different claims of complicity are.
IV. MISSING THIRD PARTIES: A TROUBLING OVERSIGHT
In her Hobby Lobby dissent, Justice Ginsburg rails against
the majority’s position in significant part because, according to
her, the Court impermissibly overlooks the costs of an accommodation to third parties 223—there, the “thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons
those corporations employ.” 224 Ginsburg cited a handful of cases
for the proposition that “[a]ccommodations to religious beliefs or
observances . . . must not significantly impinge on the interests
of third parties.” 225 As I argue in Part IV.A, however, these cases
contemplate third-party interests only tangentially, if at all.
Nor, as I argue in Part IV.B, can one find support for that proposition elsewhere in the doctrine. The law’s failure to adequately
consider third-party costs is deeply troubling for two reasons.
First, third-party effects are an ineluctable feature of complicity
claims, for complicity arises only in light of one’s contribution to
someone else’s conduct; 226 to refrain from contributing will then
223 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Ginsburg dissenting) (“In the Court’s view,
RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter
the impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith.”). Kara Loewentheil disfavors the term “third party” in this
context, as she worries that casting the individuals whom an exemption affects as “third
parties” implies that they are somehow incidental to the inquiry about whether to grant
an exemption; rather, they deserve to be at its core. Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 47
(cited in note 41). I am sympathetic to the strength of her concern for the rights and interests of these individuals, but I do not agree that, as a matter of logic and procedure,
we need to consider third parties right from the outset. Instead, the inquiry that I propose begins with the religious adherent, who must first establish that he has a claim
worthy of deference before we even need consider third-party effects. As such, there is a
way in which third-party interests are not at the core of the inquiry, and so I do not see
the need to shift terminology. For all that, however, I do not mean to suggest that third
parties’ interests are less important than Loewentheil’s account would have it.
224 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787 (Ginsburg dissenting).
225 Id at 2790 (Ginsburg dissenting).
226 See NeJaime and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2566 (cited in note 28) (“Complicitybased conscience claims assert a relationship to third parties whose conduct the claimants
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leave the third party without a contribution that she may have
been expecting (and, in the contraceptive-mandate cases, believes is her statutory right). Second, if I am right that (sincere
and apolitical 227) complicity claims warrant great deference on
the merits, as I argued above, then it becomes all the more important to examine the extrinsic effects of an accommodation
and, in particular, to consider whether it will impose undue
costs on third parties. Part IV.C paves the way for such an examination by describing a balancing test through which courts
can weigh the amount of deference that a complicity claim warrants against the magnitude of the burdens, if any, an accommodation would impose on third parties. Part IV.D applies this
balancing test to Hobby Lobby and its possible progeny.
I note at the outset that a good number of scholars believe
that the doctrine, as it stands, already contemplates third-party
interests. 228 I think that the doctrinal bases for their understanding are perilously thin, for the reasons I articulate below.
The idea is not that there is no plausible interpretation of case
law that supports their position; it is that their interpretation
does not rest on binding precedent, and it would be all too easy
for the Court to eschew it. To the extent that one can distill a
line of argument that seems to protect third-party interests,
then, that line might be evanescent. Moreover, even if these
scholars are right that the doctrine does currently contemplate
third parties, we would still have reason to be concerned, for the
doctrine says little—too little—about the way in which thirdparty interests figure in, as well as about how much they figure
view as sinful. In this sense, the third-party effects of accommodation are bound up in
the form of the claim itself.”).
227 See text accompanying notes 99–104 (stressing that complicity claims must be
sincere and deeply felt).
228 For a strong statement of this position, see Schwartzman and Tebbe, Arguing off
the Wall (cited in note 43) (“[I]n an important line of cases that has not received the attention it deserves, the Supreme Court has insisted that the Establishment Clause prohibits religious accommodations that impose burdens on third parties.”). See also
Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 349 (cited in note 43) (“[B]y shifting
the material costs of accommodating anticontraception beliefs from the employers who
hold them to their employees who do not, RFRA exemptions from the Mandate violate an
Establishment Clause constraint on permissive accommodation.”). But see Loewentheil,
62 Drake L Rev at 438 (cited in note 41) (“Our religious accommodation jurisprudence
has no principled or systematic framework for taking the interests of third parties affected by religious accommodations into account.”). It is notable that health-care-refusal
laws, which allow medical providers to refuse to participate or assist in procedures that
they oppose on religious grounds, also fail to address third-party harms. See NeJaime
and Siegel, 124 Yale L J at 2542 (cited in note 28).
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in. 229 Thus, as I argue here, it is possible that doctrine requires
courts to do no more than acknowledge that an accommodation
will impose a burden on third parties (assuming arguendo that
courts must heed third parties at all). More to the point, nothing
in the doctrine, even on an interpretation that is most congenial
to third-party interests, explicitly requires courts to deny
accommodations that would impose costs on third parties, or
even to weigh third-party interests against those of the religious
objectors in an effort to determine whether to grant an accommodation. 230 In short, as this Part aims to show, there is no
plausible reading of doctrine according to which it adequately
protects third parties. 231
A. The Hobby Lobby Dissent’s Strained Efforts to Find ThirdParty Considerations in the Doctrine
Ginsburg was right to note that the Court should have considered the costs of an accommodation on third parties, but she
was wrong to think that the Court betrayed the RFRA doctrine
in neglecting to do so. While she cited four cases for her contention that the doctrine requires courts to factor in third-party
costs, 232 I now argue that these cases do not provide the requisite
support.
In rejecting religious adherents’ requests for accommodations, two of these cases do make reference to the interests of
third parties, but only in an extremely tangential way. In
Wisconsin v Yoder, 233 the first case that Ginsburg cited, the
229 See Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 474 (cited in note 41) (“[W]e can see that the
pre-Smith constitutional framework—now applicable through the RFRA—is not completely insensitive to [concerns for third parties]. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the
legal standards do not have a consistent way of taking account of these impacts.”).
230 See Part IV.B.
231 See Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 438 (cited in note 41):

Courts and scholars have occasionally noticed that such conflicts may exist,
and with the advent of lawsuits regarding the contraceptive coverage requirement, they have been forced to confront them more directly. But neither has
suggested any systematic way of thinking about or resolving them that transcends the ill-fitting constraints of the current doctrine while remaining within
the context of free exercise law.
(citations omitted).
232 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2790 & n 8 (Ginsburg dissenting), citing Wisconsin v
Yoder, 406 US 205, 230 (1972), Estate of Thornton v Caldor, Inc, 472 US 703 (1985),
Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 US 709, 720 (2005), and Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc v
Superior Court, 85 P3d 67, 93 (Cal 2004).
233 406 US 205 (1972).
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Court faced a religious challenge to a law requiring students to
attend school through the age of sixteen. The challengers were
Amish parents with high school–aged children who maintained
that their faith prohibited sending their children to secular
school past the eighth grade, both for fear of the corrupting influence of a secular education and to preserve the youths’ time to
assume the farming obligations that they incurred in later adolescence. 234 In upholding the Amish parents’ religious objections,
the Court was careful to note that religion would not always
function as a trump. It thus referenced cases in which religious
beliefs have been made to yield to secular laws because the religious conduct sought to be protected posed a “substantial threat
to public safety, peace or order.” 235 The Court then noted that the
conduct at issue in Yoder posed no such threat and so those
cases did not determine the outcome for the case at hand. 236
There is, to be sure, a sense in which threats to public safety, peace, and order affect third parties. But the Court can weigh
these threats in its determination to grant an exemption without referencing third parties at all. The government’s interest in
maintaining public safety, peace, and order suffices. And indeed,
that is the most plausible way to read the other related case that
Ginsburg cited, Cutter v Wilkinson. 237 There, facing inmates’ requests for religious accommodations under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 238 (RLUIPA), the
Court recognized the Bureau of Prisons’ “need to maintain order
and safety” 239 (although, again, the Court concluded that safety
could be maintained consistent with the accommodations). But
order and safety are concerns of the government, not concerns of
third parties—that is, other inmates—who might be harmed if
hell were to break loose. The Court expressed as much when it
noted, in the context of discussing relevant prior decisions, that
“[c]ourts [ ] may be expected to recognize the government’s [ ]
compelling interest in not facilitating inflammatory racist activity that could imperil prison security and order.” 240 Describing
Id at 209–13.
Id at 230, quoting Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 402 (1963).
236 Yoder, 406 US at 230.
237 544 US 709 (2005).
238 Pub L No 106-274, 114 Stat 803, codified at 42 USC § 2000cc et seq. RLUIPA effectively extends RFRA to those “residing in or confined to” a government-run institution. 42 USC § 2000cc-1(a).
239 Cutter, 544 US at 722.
240 Id at 723 n 11 (emphasis added).
234
235
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the relevant interests as the government’s makes clear that the
Court was concerned not with protecting the targets of racism
but instead with providing for a safe and orderly prison. 241
The next case that Ginsburg cited involved an Establishment
Clause claim. Estate of Thornton v Caldor, Inc 242 addressed a
Connecticut statute that required businesses to grant Sabbath
leave to any employee who requested it on religious grounds, no
matter the day that the Sabbath was observed. 243 The Court did
refer to third parties there, but not to claim that they have interests that the Court must consider in their own right. Instead,
the Court did so to establish that an exemption would violate
the Establishment Clause by privileging one set of interests (for
example, those of religious employees who observe a Saturday
Sabbath) over another (for example, those of employees who do
not observe Sabbath but who might nonetheless have good
reasons to want Saturday as their day off). Thus, the Court reviewed all of the ways in which the statute’s “absolute” requirement—its “unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers”—elevated the interests of religious employees over
nonreligious ones, and it therefore concluded that “the statute
[went] beyond having an incidental or remote effect of advancing
religion. The statute ha[d] a primary effect that impermissibly
advance[d] a particular religious practice.” 244 We can see, then,
that third-party interests did not function in that case as they
would need to in order to conclude that they are what mattered
in the Court’s determination. The Court referenced the effects on
third parties as a premise in an argument whose conclusion was
that the law violated the Establishment Clause. If the Court
cared about third-party interests for their own sake, it would
have been enough that the law imposed burdens on third parties
by making it harder for them to have their preferred days off.
There would have been no need for the Court to justify its refusal
241 The same can be said for other cases in which the Court denies religious entities
special treatment on grounds that superficially suggest an interest in protecting racial
minorities from animus but, on closer examination, speak to the government’s or the
public’s interest in living in a society free of racism, and not to the particular interests
that members of the targeted minorities might have in not suffering from that discrimination. See, for example, Bob Jones, 461 US at 604 (defending the Internal Revenue Service’s decision to withdraw tax-exempt status from a university that prohibited interracial dating or marriage on the ground that “the Government has a fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education”) (emphasis added).
242 472 US 703 (1985).
243 Id at 705–06.
244 Id at 710 (citations omitted).
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to grant the exemption based on a concern about the evils of
government support of religion in their own right. 245
Ginsburg’s final case was a California Supreme Court decision involving a nonprofit seeking an exemption from a contraceptive mandate contained in California’s health-care law.246
This case has the most direct, seemingly supportive statement of
Ginsburg’s position. There, the court stated: “We are unaware of
any decision in which this court, or the United States Supreme
Court, has exempted a religious objector from the operation of a
neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that
the requested exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of
third parties,” 247 and it cited Yoder and United States v Lee 248 as
evidence. 249 But Yoder, we have seen, did not involve third-party
rights. 250 And Lee, a case rejecting an Amish employer’s plea for
245 Similar considerations allow us to dispose of the suggestion that Trans World
Airlines, Inc v Hardison, 432 US 63 (1977) (“TWA”), turned on third-party interests, as
some commentators have suggested. See, for example, Wilson, 53 BC L Rev at 1464
n 183 (cited in note 18). In TWA, the Court addressed a religious adherent’s claim that
TWA violated his rights to religious accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by failing to give him a day off on the day of his Sabbath. TWA, 432 US at
67–70. In response, the Court noted that it would be costly to TWA to grant the requested day off, and it held that “to require TWA to bear additional costs when no such costs
are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want would involve unequal
treatment of employees on the basis of their religion.” Id at 84. Title VII could not support this kind of discrimination and so the Court denied the accommodation. Id. Here, as
in Thornton, the Court invoked third parties, but it did not do so because third-party
interests were themselves at issue. Instead, and again as in Thornton, the treatment of
third parties was relevant only as an evidentiary matter—that treatment demonstrated
that the religious adherent was indeed seeking a privilege that the company did not bestow on others. Id at 92. Acceding to the religious adherent’s request, then, would have
the Court favor religion impermissibly; it is this favoring, not the effect on third parties,
that sustains the Court’s decision.
246 See Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 74–76.
247 Id at 93.
248 455 US 252 (1982).
249 Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 93.
250 See text accompanying notes 233–36. The California Supreme Court also appears to have read Yoder incorrectly. It stated that, in Yoder, in evaluating whether to
grant an “exemption from a general law requiring [ ] older children to attend public
school, the [United States Supreme C]ourt emphasized that its conclusion depended on
the assumption that no Amish child wished to attend.” Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 93
(emphasis added). But the United States Supreme Court said exactly the opposite:
“[O]ur holding today in no degree depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the
child as contrasted with that of the parents.” Yoder, 406 US at 230 (emphasis added).
And Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the Court, went on to say that “it is [the parents’] right of free exercise, not that of their children, that must determine Wisconsin’s
power to impose criminal penalties on the parent.” Id at 230–31. In this way, the Court
considered only the parents’ interests, and not the interests of their children, who were
third parties to the litigation. The discrepancy between the California Supreme Court’s
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an exemption from social security taxes, does not turn on the interests of third parties either. 251 Instead, Lee turns on the adverse consequences to the system as a whole if courts were to
begin granting exemptions to tax burdens on an ad hoc basis.252
And the more general review of the case law undertaken here
demonstrates that it is entirely reasonable that the California
Supreme Court would not have been aware of United States
Supreme Court cases in which the Court squarely recognized
third-party costs and yet granted the exemption anyway.253
reading of Yoder and the text of Yoder itself casts doubt on the former’s ability to proceed
as a faithful reader of constitutional doctrine.
251 See generally Lee, 455 US 252. The Court did say in passing that “[g]ranting an
exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer’s
religious faith on the employees.” Id at 261. But this is dictum. The Court’s reason for
refusing the exemption is, as I argue in the text following this note, a concern about the
workability of the social security system as a whole, not a concern about depriving the
business’s non-Amish workers of social security benefits. See id at 263 (Stevens concurring) (“I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the difficulties associated with processing
other claims to tax exemption on religious grounds justify a rejection of this claim.”).
252 See id at 260:
The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge
the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates
their religious belief. . . . Because the broad public interest in maintaining a
sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the
payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
This argument appears to be in tension with a provision that already existed at the
time of Lee, which the petitioner in Lee cited—namely, an exemption for self-employed
individuals whose religion opposed social security benefits and whose sect provided care
for their own elderly. See 26 USC § 1402(g). One might then think that the problem in
Lee went not to a concern for the tax system as a whole but instead to a concern for third
parties: Lee threatened to deny non-Amish employees social security benefits, whereas
the existing exemption for self-employed individuals concerned only the Amish person
himself. Indeed, Ginsburg, in her Hobby Lobby dissent, stated that “the Court recognized
in Lee that allowing a religion-based exemption to a commercial employer would
‘operat[e] to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.’” Hobby Lobby, 134
S Ct at 2804 (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Lee, 455 US at 261. See also Bob Egelko,
Supreme Court Unmoved by Religious Employer’s Coverage Objections — for the Amish
(SFGate, Aug 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TB4X-NLLH (quoting Professor
Micah Schwartzman, who “contrasted the court’s concern for the Amish farmer’s workers
[in Lee] in 1982 with its brush-off of Hobby Lobby’s employees”).
The language from Lee referencing the burdens that third parties might incur appears in the very last paragraph of the decision and likely constitutes mere rhetorical
flourish rather than a premise necessary to the holding. See Lee, 455 US at 261. At any
rate, the quotation from Lee merely states the fact that granting the employer an exemption would impose costs on those of his employees who do not share his faith. It does not
say that the exemption would therefore be unconstitutional, or even that courts would
have to weigh these costs against the employer’s rights of religious freedom. As such, the
quoted language leaves the question of how third-party costs matter—and in particular
whether they would affect the outcome at all—totally unclear.
253 See Catholic Charities, 85 P3d at 93.
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These cases do not exist, because the Court never squarely factors third-party costs into its determinations about whether to
grant religious exemptions in the first place. 254
B. The Troubling Omission of Third-Party Costs
One might think that current doctrine already allows for the
consideration of third-party interests, even if their interests
have been given short shrift in practice. Here I address three
doctrines that appear, at least superficially, to address thirdparty interests, and I argue that none is ultimately up to the
task.

254 The California Supreme Court cited two other cases in passing for the proposition that courts will not grant religious exemptions when the exemptions would adversely affect third parties. In the first case, Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v Secretary of
Labor, 471 US 290 (1985), the United States Supreme Court rejected a plea for an exemption from the minimum wage and reporting requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). Id at 304–05. The relevant provisions of the FLSA were 29 USC
§§ 206(b), 207(a), 211(c), 215(a)(2), and 215(a)(5). The Court rejected the plea because it
found that the FLSA imposed no burden whatsoever on the objectors. Tony and Susan
Alamo Foundation, 471 US at 303–06. As such, the Court did not need to undertake an
inquiry into the interests that the legal requirements were intended to serve, and it did
not undertake that inquiry. In the second case, also involving an as-applied challenge to
the FLSA, the Fourth Circuit also found that the burden on religion, if any, was “limited.”
Dole v Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F2d 1389, 1397–98 (4th Cir 1990). It nonetheless
went on to assess the interest intended to be served by the FLSA, which it identified as
an interest in protecting women from employment discrimination by ensuring equal pay
for both sexes. Id at 1398. This looks to be an interest in protecting third parties, but it is
an interest that “counts” only because it is the asserted interest of the government in
imposing the FLSA in the first place. Id. In this way, the interest in women’s equality is
like the interest of the Cutter inmates in security—they are interests that receive judicial notice only because the government has chosen to adopt these interests as its own. I
elaborate on the distinction between addressing third-party interests squarely versus
tangentially in the text following this note. In any event, the court in Shenandoah
Baptist Church upheld the FLSA requirements not so much because of anyone’s interests in equal pay as because of reasons similar to those underpinning Lee—namely, interests in maintaining Congress’s objectives by ensuring the universal application of the
law. As the court said:

There is no principled way of exempting the school without exempting all other
sectarian schools and thereby the thousands of lay teachers and staff members
on their payrolls. This would undermine the congressional goal of making minimum wage and equal pay requirements applicable to private as well as public
schools.
Id. Only a very strained reading of the case, then, would allow one to infer that it sought
to protect the interests of those whom an exemption would directly affect.
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1. The compelling-interest prong of RFRA.
In defending a legal requirement against a claim that the
requirement substantially burdens an objector’s exercise of religion, the government is asked to adduce the compelling interest
that the challenged requirement is designed to serve. 255 Sometimes, the government’s interest coincides with that of third parties. Yet there is no reason to think that this will always be true,
and when the two diverge, the government need not press both
its own interest as well as the third parties’ interest. 256 Thus, for
example, consider a religious adherent who objects to a military
draft because he believes homosexuality is evil and, in the wake
of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 257 he would find
it too offensive to his values to serve alongside individuals who
are openly gay. The legal requirement he challenges—that is,
his conscription—is motivated by concerns for national security.
These may be compelling enough in their own right to deny the
objector an exemption, but even if they are, they do not at all
track what is at stake for the gays and lesbians whom this objector’s claim denigrates. The government’s compelling interest,
then, might not include the interests of third parties. Accordingly,
a test that does not look to third-party costs over and above the
government’s interest is likely to leave third parties out in the
cold.
2. The Establishment Clause.
Some commentators look to the Establishment Clause to
protect third parties from a religious exemption that would
otherwise burden them. Thus, for example, Professor Frederick
Gedicks and his coauthor Rebecca Van Tassell contend that “the
Court condemns permissive accommodations on Establishment
Clause grounds when the accommodations impose significant
burdens on third parties who do not believe or participate in the

See 42 USC § 2000bb-1.
Justice Kennedy, in his Hobby Lobby concurrence, seems to recognize that thirdparty interests count when, but only when, they are the interests that the government
sought to advance through the legal requirement in question. According to him, religious
exercise may not “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2787
(Kennedy concurring). Not all interests warrant protection, then—only those that “the
law deems compelling.” Id (Kennedy concurring).
257 Pub L No 111-321, 124 Stat 3515.
255
256
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accommodated practice.” 258 Even assuming that their contention
is correct, 259 it does not fully capture the concern here—that the

258 Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 349 (cited in note 43). See
also Gedicks and Koppelman, 67 Vand L Rev En Banc at 54 (cited in note 41) (arguing
that an exemption from the contraceptive mandate violates the Establishment Clause,
which “prohibit[s] RFRA’s application when . . . a particular exemption would shift the
costs of the accommodated religious practice to identifiable and discrete third parties”);
Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2802 n 25 (Ginsburg dissenting).
259 I have my doubts, though I will restrict myself here to taking issue with just one
strand of argument that those with a more capacious understanding of the Establishment
Clause have marshaled. Some theorists point out that Thornton, discussed above, favorably quotes Judge Learned Hand’s contention that “[t]he First Amendment . . . gives no
one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their
conduct to his own religious necessities.” Thornton, 472 US at 710, quoting Otten v
Baltimore & O. R. Co, 205 F2d 58, 61 (2d Cir 1953). These theorists read in this statement the Court’s recognition that the government may not protect religion when doing so
would impinge on others’ rights. See, for example, Schwartzman and Tebbe, Arguing off
the Wall (cited in note 43); Gedicks and Van Tassell, 49 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 358 (cited
in note 43). See also Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2791 (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Zechariah Chafee Jr, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv L Rev 932, 957 (1919) (“[W]ith
respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech claims, ‘[y]our right to swing your
arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.’”) (quotation marks omitted).
In response, it is worth looking at the Learned Hand quotation in the context in
which Thornton invokes it. The full quotation from Thornton is as follows:

This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests
contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, so well articulated by Judge Learned Hand:
“The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit
of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.”
As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental or remote effect of
advancing religion. . . . The statute has a primary effect that impermissibly
advances a particular religious practice.
Thornton, 472 US at 710. The meaning of the Learned Hand quotation itself can be further gleaned if it is read along with its surrounding language: “The First Amendment
protects one against action by the government, though even then, not in all circumstances; but it gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.” Otten, 205 F2d at 61 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The point there was that one cannot claim First
Amendment protections against nonstate actors—there, union employees who pressured
the employer (a private railway company) to discharge the plaintiff because the plaintiff
refused to join the union. The issue in Otten, then, was whether the plaintiff could convince a court to compel others to alter their conduct—in that case, by giving up the bargaining power that the union members would enjoy only if that place of employment
were a “union shop”—because union membership contravened the employee’s religious
convictions. Id at 59–60. The plaintiff’s request, Learned Hand argued, was no different
from that of a “man [who] might find it incompatible with his conscience to live in a city
in which open saloons were licensed; yet he would have no constitutional right to insist
that the saloons must be closed.” Id at 61. Learned Hand’s position then contemplates
not cases in which someone seeks a religious accommodation and third parties are affected incidentally; instead, it applies to cases in which controlling third parties’ conduct
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doctrine does not adequately consider the burdens that third
parties might incur in light of an exemption. For one thing, all of
Hobby Lobby’s employees who do not share its religious views
have reason to feel affronted by its religious exercise. The
Establishment Clause concern is not restricted, then, to the
women who will be denied contraception as a result of the exemption. Second, there may be cases in which a religious exemption does not result in an Establishment Clause violation, and
yet third parties do have genuine cause to feel that their interests have been sacrificed. Suppose that the Amish teens in
Yoder, for example, had wanted to continue with their secular
schooling because they found their interactions with secular
peers enriching. Their interest in continued schooling—namely,
exposure to diverse peers—would be different from the interests
Wisconsin proffered in support of the law requiring schooling
through age sixteen—namely, ensuring a reasonably educated
electorate; 260 the teens’ interests would not be rooted in a complaint about the state’s undue support of religion. If the Court
were then to grant the teens’ parents the requested exemption,
the teens would have reason to feel aggrieved and their grievance
is the precise and only purpose of the sought-after accommodation. This is a decisive
distinction.
Return now to the portion of Thornton in which the Learned Hand quotation appears. There, Burger cited two cases for the proposition that government action that only
incidentally advances religion does not violate the Establishment Clause. In one of those
cases, the Court upheld a Maryland statute providing grants to private colleges—both
secular and religious—so long as the grants were used for nonsectarian purposes.
Roemer v Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 US 736, 747 (1976). In the other, the
Court upheld, against an Establishment Clause challenge, a New York statute authorizing the state to buy and then lend secular textbooks to high school students attending
both public and private (including parochial) schools. Board of Education of Central
School District No 1 v Allen, 392 US 236, 248–49 (1968). Again, the books themselves
were not religious in nature, and the financial relief that they provided benefited the
students’ parents, not the schools themselves. Id at 243–45. The contrast between
Thornton and these two cases is relevant here, because it underscores that what mattered to the Court in Thornton was government support for religion and not government
accommodations that shift burdens to third parties. Put differently, the Connecticut law
challenged in Thornton would have been found defective even if it prevented no secular
employee from having his preferred day off. The defect lay in the formal favoring of religious interests and not in any setback to secular interests. It is for this reason that
Burger ended his discussion with the conclusion that, unlike the Maryland and New
York statutes, the Connecticut statute “has a primary effect that impermissibly advances
a particular religious practice.” Thornton, 472 US at 710 (emphasis added). On the logic
of that case, the government may not advance religion, full stop. Third-party effects are
neither necessary nor sufficient for the Court to find an Establishment Clause violation.
260 Wisconsin had argued that education was necessary for participation in democratic life and for cultivating self-sufficiency. Yoder, 406 US at 221.
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would have nothing to do with an Establishment Clause violation. 261 In this way, the Establishment Clause can protect the
rights of third parties in only a subset of the cases in which their
interests are threatened.
3. The “shoals” causing claims for religious accommodation
to founder.
I argued above that Cutter weighed the burden of a legal
requirement against the government’s interest in prison security; it held that a religious accommodation would not in fact undermine that interest, and so it granted the exemption. As such,
the case cannot fairly be read as an example of the Court weighing a bid for religious accommodation against the interests of
discrete third parties. With that said, it is worth noting that
Cutter contains what is perhaps the most succinct statement to
the effect that third-party harms matter. Listing the “shoals” on
which prior bids for religious accommodation have “founder[ed],”
the Court stated, “Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation
may impose on nonbeneficiaries.” 262 This is powerful language,
all the more so because Justice Alito quotes it in a footnote in
the Hobby Lobby majority opinion, in a discussion about whether courts may deny religious exemptions from programs aimed
at providing benefits to third parties. 263 One might then think

261 One who holds that the Establishment Clause prohibits religious accommodations that would harm third parties will object to my treatment of the hypothetical Yoder
variant that I describe. The objection would proceed as follows: If the Amish teens want
to continue their secular education, and a court affords their parents a religious exemption that prevents the teens from doing so, the teens will have reason to think that the
court has impermissibly supported religion at their expense. In other words, the exemption would, contrary to my argument, violate the Establishment Clause. In response, it is
worth noting that whether the Establishment Clause contemplates third-party costs in
this way is precisely the issue. Reviewing the case law, I have sought to argue that we
cannot accurately read Establishment Clause case law in this way. As such, the teens
could not wield the Establishment Clause to contest the costs that they would incur from their
parents’ religious exemption. See Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 475 (cited in note 41):

[T]he problem is not so much protecting third parties from being forced to participate indirectly in someone else’s religious practices or suffer for them, but is
rather—or additionally—that [third parties] sometimes have independently existing interests, both practical and expressive, which are subordinated to religious interests when accommodations are granted.
262
263

Cutter, 544 US at 720.
See Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781 n 37.
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that the settled view of the Court is that third-party costs
matter. 264
Yet even if the Court has adopted the view that it must
“take adequate account” of third-party costs, 265 this would hardly
establish that the Court is committed to protecting third parties.
The meaning and implications of the Cutter language are radically unclear. What will count as having taken “adequate account” of third-party interests? How much weight must these interests be given for a court’s accounting to have been
“adequate”? And what does giving them their due weight entail?
Is it enough for a court merely to note that the exemption will
impose burdens on third parties? Or does the statement mean
that, when courts do recognize that third parties will be burdened, they should seek to arrive at an alternative accommodation? Or should they deny the accommodation altogether? Cutter
itself provides no answers to these questions, because the Court
found that “nonbeneficiaries” would not be harmed by the requested accommodation. 266 The Hobby Lobby majority arrived at
the same conclusion with respect to the third parties there, given the availability of alternative arrangements for providing
contraception. 267
At any rate, the foregoing analysis of the relevant case law
suggests that the claim that courts must take “adequate
account” of the interests of “nonbeneficiaries” fails to find support in prior cases. It would be all too easy for a court to dismiss
this part of Cutter on the ground that Cutter incorrectly interpreted its precedents and the case itself looked to the effects of
an accommodation only on the government’s interests, not on
the interests of third parties. Third parties should not have to
rely on so precarious a statement of what the law requires.

264 I am grateful to Professors Koppelman and Schwartzman, each of whom urged
this language upon me.
265 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781 n 37.
266 See Cutter, 544 US at 720. One might seek further support for the claim that
third-party costs matter in their own right in the following Cutter language: “Should inmate requests for religious accommodations . . . impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons . . . the facility would be free to resist the imposition.” Id at 726.
But again, the language is unhelpfully vague because we are not told what counts as a
burden, let alone an unjustified burden, and the Court did not have occasion to decide
the matter in Cutter itself because it found no burden there.
267 Hobby Lobby, 134 S Ct at 2781 n 37.
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4. Third-party intervention.
Even if one agrees that neither RFRA nor the Establishment
Clause straightforwardly contemplates third-party interests, one
might think that the concern about overlooking third parties is
mitigated by the possibility that they will seek to intervene in
the case and bring their interests before the court in that way. 268
But it would be foolhardy to rely on this mechanism alone. For
one thing, possibly affected third parties must seek a court’s
permission to be heard, and the court has discretion to grant or
deny the intervention. 269 For another, while the contraceptivemandate cases received a lot of publicity—and so readily put
third parties on notice that their rights were subject to abrogation—many other cases seeking religious exemptions may not be
so prominent. When they are not, third parties cannot be counted on to know of their own accord that their interests are at
stake. Finally, it is unfair for third parties to incur litigation
costs to protect their interests when they are not impinging on
the objectors’ rights of free exercise any more than anyone else is.
***
I argued above that a court should proceed with great deference when facing a claim for religious exemption. The court
should, in particular, judge the claim on the merits only to the
extent that the claim rests on suspect empirical facts. But if
there are few intrinsic limits on claims of complicity, then there
is an even greater need to attend to extrinsic concerns—
specifically, the effect an accommodation might have on third
parties. Pluralism demands respect for religious differences, but
that respect goes both ways: it entails that we must be open to
many claims of conscience, but we must also ensure that these
claims do not unduly or disproportionately interfere with the interests of discrete third parties. I turn now to some concrete
suggestions for operationalizing this careful balancing act.
268 See, for example, Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 558–59 (granting leave to intervene to
three Notre Dame students who claimed an interest in the contraceptive coverage they
would receive were Notre Dame not granted an exemption).
269 See FRCP 24(b). There are cases in which third parties are accorded intervention
as of right. See FRCP 24(a). But it is not at all clear that the religious-exemption cases
are of this kind. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit treated the Notre Dame students’ intervention as one requiring the court’s permission. See Notre Dame, 743 F3d at 558 (“We need
to say something about the three Notre Dame students whom we have allowed to
intervene.”) (emphasis added).
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C. Balancing Concerns for Complicity against Third-Party
Costs
We have seen that claims of complicity have moral, empirical, and relational dimensions, and that each of these may require a different level of deference. At the same time, whatever
the level of deference accorded to a complicity claim, it must still
be balanced against the burdens, if any, that an accommodation
would impose on third parties. In this Section, I seek to put
these two pieces together, first reviewing the kinds of claims
that warrant deference on the merits and then bringing to bear
the extrinsic consideration of third-party costs. 270
1. Assessing the strength of complicity claims.
As I argued above in the discussion about the three kinds of
deference, 271 the government need not defer to complicity claims
that are premised on mistakes of empirical fact. As such, the
government may deny an exemption based on a claim of complicity that turns on factual errors, even if an exemption would impose no third-party costs.
Matters are more complicated when it comes to complicity
claims that turn on nonstandard moral or relational premises,
however. Given that courts may not assess the cogency of an objector’s moral claims, the moral elements of a conscientious objection must be treated with absolute deference for the reasons
stated above. Courts must then take at face value an objector’s
claim that a certain act (for example, the use of contraception,
receipt of a blood transfusion, and so forth) is wrong. With that
said, courts are not without the resources to address hate-based
claims—such as those declaring homosexuality evil—as I argued
above. 272
It is more difficult to grant a categorical right of deference
to relational claims, especially given the possibility that
someone might claim a causal connection that is extravagantly
270 Schwartzman also advocates a balancing approach in cases in which, for example, taxpayers are made to support government activities that their convictions oppose.
But Schwartzman’s balancing approach remains faithful to the RFRA doctrine insofar as
it restricts its focus to the interests of the objector, on the one hand, and the government,
on the other. As with the RFRA test, then, Schwartzman’s test does not attend to the
interests of third parties who might come to be burdened were the religious objector
granted an accommodation. See Schwartzman, 97 Va L Rev at 346–54 (cited in note 35).
271 See Part I.D.
272 See text accompanying note 118.
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far-fetched. 273 Nonetheless, deference should be the default here,
given that concerns about complicity can strike at the heart of
the believer’s conscience and given that, unlike with empirical
claims, we lack nonneutral considerations with which to dispute
the metaphysics underpinning the more expansive notions of
complicity in conscientious objectors’ claims. 274 Courts may
abandon the default only when the claim is interwoven with
empirical assertions that are themselves clearly mistaken. Thus,
for example, consider an employer who seeks to exclude coverage
for ultrasounds during pregnancy from his health insurance
plan on the belief that ultrasounds are a sufficient cause of lefthandedness in the resulting child and that left-handedness is
evil. It would be easy to defeat this claim on the factual merits
(most women have ultrasounds during pregnancy and most children are not left-handed). Less far-fetched metaphysical claims,
at least when they entail more responsibility rather than less,
must be treated with deference.
2. Balancing deference against third-party interests.
The fact that all moral and many relational claims must be
treated with deference does not automatically entail an exemption; it merely shifts the burden of the inquiry. The government
then needs to defend the challenged legal requirement, as RFRA
requires. But a separate, additional set of considerations must
be brought to bear—namely, considerations tracking the interests of third parties. 275
See note 155 and accompanying text.
See Rawls, Political Liberalism at 144–50 (cited in note 115) (describing an overlapping consensus and maintaining that we can reach decisions on the basic political
structure of society—notwithstanding differences in individuals’ metaphysical commitments—so long as these different commitments nonetheless support the same policy
outcomes).
275 Professor Eric Orts has argued that it is tendentious to speak of third parties’
interests rather than their rights—for example, rights to contraceptive coverage under
the ACA. See Eric Orts, Undertheorizing the Corporation Continued: Hobby Lobby and
Employees’ Rights (The Conglomerate, July 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4GW
P-24BE. He compellingly contends that framing the conflict as one between religious
rights and third-party interests already tips the balance in favor of the employers, because rights trump interests. As a general matter, I agree, but I nonetheless describe
what is at stake for third parties in terms of their interests, rather than their rights, because I mean for the test that I describe to apply to all complicity claims, and some of
these threaten to impose costs on third parties even when they do not threaten to infringe any third parties’ rights. I am also not convinced that referring to the employees’
“rights” under the ACA is any less tendentious. The rights employees have are not necessarily rights against their employers: It was the HHS rules, rather than the statute
273
274
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Deference is a binary term in this context—a claim of complicity either does or does not get deference. There is no middle
ground when it comes to moral or relational claims because
there is no legitimate scale according to which one could measure the magnitude of the claim’s plausibility. Instead, plausibility weightings are off the table.
Third-party costs, by contrast, are scalar. The greater the
cost to third parties of an exemption, the more weight thirdparty interests should carry. The process of weighing something
with an absolute value against something with a scalar value
requires that we posit a threshold on the scalar side of the equation: costs exceeding some threshold amount should be found
untenable and so exemptions should be denied when these excessive costs would otherwise result.
Specifying the location of the threshold on a cost spectrum is
a matter for democratic deliberation. There is no a priori,
context-independent answer to the question of how much of a
burden it is fair to impose on third parties for the sake of respecting religious observance. 276 Several ancillary considerations

itself, that mandated cost-free access to contraception. And even if the government chose
to grant women these rights, it did not need to impose the corresponding duty on their
employers.
276 Loewentheil contends that equality-implicating third-party costs should defeat a
bid for an exemption so long as they are “substantial,” which she understands to mean
neither “de minimis” nor “exceedingly rare.” Loewentheil, 62 Drake L Rev at 477 (cited
in note 41). She arrives at this contention because she thinks equality-implicating rights
are just as important as rights of religious freedom and that the latter ground claims for
accommodation so long as the challenged legal requirement “substantially” burdens religious exercise. Id at 483 (“If the core of free exercise doctrine is the desire to protect religious exercise from discrimination that would render believers unequal to other citizens,
its protections should only extend so far as they do not undermine the equality of nonbelievers on the other side.”) (citation omitted).
In contrast to Loewentheil, I have argued that the purpose of rights of conscience is
not (or not merely) to prevent discrimination against those with deeply held convictions
that conflict with the law but (also) to promote lives of integrity. On my way of thinking,
living according to conscience is an important human good, one that the government
should protect, all else equal. See Part III.B (describing the place of conscience in one’s
sense of self and meaning and, as a result, the deep pain that attends violations of conscience). See also Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality 11
(Harvard 2013) (arguing that the First Amendment reasonably “treats religion as a distinctive human good” and concluding that it is therefore “not unfair” to give religion special treatment); McConnell, 103 Harv L Rev at 1517 (cited in note 32):
To [those who saw in America a refuge for religious exercise], the freedom to
follow religious dogma was one of this nation’s foremost blessings, and the willingness of the nation to respect the claims of a higher authority than “those
whose business it is to make laws” was one of the surest signs of its liberality.
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warrant mention, however. First, the government should seek to
minimize occasions for conflict between religious beliefs and
third-party interests. (I note, for example, that a national
health-care plan—whatever its other demerits—would have obviated employers’ conscientious objections to the ACA.) 277 The
government did so when it excluded churches from the contraceptive mandate at the outset. It might have foreseen objections
to the contraceptive mandate from religious institutions and
even from for-profit entities, and so provided universal access to
contraception outside of the employer-subsidized insurance delivery system. Second, when third-party interests would be implicated were an exemption granted, courts and the government
must work to ensure that these interests are raised and adequately defended.
3. Bringing third-party interests before a court.
This brings us to the final piece of doctrinal revision, which
provides a means for third parties to have their interests represented in court. The government bears an obligation to assess
whether a requested exemption would impose costs on third parties. When the government determines that it would, the government must make a good faith effort to alert the relevant
third parties to the proceedings. For example, the government
might contact a representative advocacy group (for example, the
National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, in
the case of the contraceptive mandate), or take out ads in national news sources (paper and electronic).
Further, the government—which is to say, taxpayers—
should fund the third parties’ legal representation. As a society,
we should be willing to incur some costs in exchange for conferring religious freedom. But those costs should be shared equally
among us. We would impermissibly chill requests for religious
exemptions were we to require the objectors to pay for third parties’ legal representation. And requiring third parties to fully
fund their efforts to protect themselves would expose them to a
I thus view living conscientiously as deeply important, though just how important it is
and how its importance should be weighed against other interests are matters that we
citizens must together decide. Given the role I contemplate for democratic deliberation in
this area, I resist Loewentheil’s a priori idea that rights of conscience are on par with
equality-implicating interests.
277 I elaborate on this suggestion in a Washington Post op-ed. See Sepinwall, Can a
Corporation Have a Conscience? (cited in note 29).
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disproportionate burden, even if they were to prevail. Accordingly, the government should have to subsidize third parties’ legal
costs, on behalf of us all. 278
Finally, it would not be sufficient to contact only the third
parties most immediately affected by the case—for example,
Hobby Lobby’s employees, given that the exemption affects the
health-care coverage that they will enjoy. Hobby Lobby has
precedential value for pending contraceptive challenges and for
any other challenges that will be filed in its wake. Thus, it
stands to affect the interests of many women of reproductive
age, and it is for this reason that notice should extend beyond
the Hobby Lobby employees themselves. And there is a separate
reason to notify an advocacy organization, rather than the potentially affected employees themselves: As Professors Micah
Schwartzman and Nelson Tebbe compellingly argued with respect to Hobby Lobby, “employees are (understandably) reluctant to come forward against their employers, even though their
constitutional claim is strong and even though they have a lot to
lose if the case goes the wrong way.” 279 Their concerns would obtain in any employer-mandate challenge.
D. Assessing Hobby Lobby and Its Progeny in Light of the
Proposed Balancing Test
The proposed revisions to the doctrine articulated here
would likely not have altered the outcome in Hobby Lobby. To be
sure, women of childbearing age ought to have been entitled to
express the nature and meaning of the consequences an accommodation would yield for them. But the Court should have ruled
in favor of Hobby Lobby’s requested exemption even had it attended to third-party costs. This is because an exemption for
Hobby Lobby would not in fact have imposed any costs on third
parties: the government had already established a work-around
for the contraceptive mandate for religious nonprofits. With that
alternative arrangement in place, the Court was in a position to
offer Hobby Lobby an exemption at virtually no cost to Hobby
Lobby’s employees or their dependents. As such, given the fact
278 For that matter, we might decide that parties who succeed in securing a conscientious exemption should have their legal fees reimbursed, too, or at least that we
should offer as much to those plaintiffs who can show financial hardship. If conscience is
worth protecting, then we might not want the ability to pay to stand as a barrier to those
with legitimate claims.
279 Schwartzman and Tebbe, Arguing off the Wall (cited in note 43).
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that Hobby Lobby’s claim deserved deference (it turned on moral
and relational premises that courts may not challenge) 280 and
that granting the claim would not ultimately impose burdens on
third parties, the Court was right to uphold Hobby Lobby’s
exemption.
But Hobby Lobby was unusual. We should expect that other
cases will not involve a work-around that is so readily at hand.
In these other cases, courts will have to do the serious work of
weighing the religious adherent’s claim of complicity against the
costs that an accommodation would impose on third parties.
Again, just how much of a burden would be legitimate to impose
on third parties is a matter for democratic deliberation. We can
nonetheless anticipate the proper outcomes in a few discrete
examples.
Claims seeking religious exemptions from coverage for lifesaving measures (for example, blood transfusions) should be denied, given the magnitude of the interests at stake for third parties (here, life or death) unless the government can arrive at an
alternative funding arrangement that leaves third parties no
worse off. We should expect that claims seeking religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws would typically fail as well.
The third parties whose interests are implicated in these cases
are not only those who are immediately denied service or employment by the religious objector. All members of the group facing discrimination can claim an expressive injury from the discrimination. And other historically oppressed groups can claim
that an exemption threatens them with an injury, too: the state
that would grant a request to discriminate fails to take seriously
the great evil of discrimination and thus undermines the sense
of security and respect that a decent state should confer on all
its citizens. 281
280 I have noted that Hobby Lobby’s claim rested on the dubious empirical assumption that the four contested methods of contraception were “abortifacients.” See notes
130–34 and accompanying text. If the medical community were certain that the four contraceptive methods never operated by destroying embryos, then the Court could have
disposed of Hobby Lobby’s claim on empirical grounds, finding that it did not deserve
any deference. But the medical community instead allows that there is at least a theoretical possibility that the contraceptive methods in question work in just the way that
Hobby Lobby fears. See notes 131–34. And because Hobby Lobby contends that it will
feel itself to be complicit just so long as it contributes to conduct that has even a remote
chance of leading to embryo destruction, the Court was right to treat its claim deferentially, for the reasons advanced here.
281 Others who support gay rights have nonetheless been more hospitable to the idea
that opponents of same-sex marriage should be permitted to abstain from contributing to
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There will of course be cases far harder than these. But we
should feel more confident in the ability of courts to appropriately
assess claims of complicity once we appreciate the reasons for
which these claims can be inherently compelling and once we
expand the test for an accommodation so that it factors in the
costs that an exemption would impose on third parties.
CONCLUSION AND A PERSONAL APOLOGIA
The freedom that we cherish and that our constitutional regime enshrines is the freedom to create for ourselves lives of
meaning and value. 282 Conscience is central to that endeavor,
and the law should then protect each of us from having to act
against our consciences, at least when the protection can be had
without imposing undue costs on others. Moreover, conscience is
not an after-work or off-hours indulgence; indeed, only a cruel
and unyielding conception of work would require that we turn
our selves off during the time we spend on the job. It is for this
reason that courts should treat requests for religious exemptions
from specific provisions of the employer mandate with substantial deference.
With that said, I confess that the prospect that women’s
sexual or reproductive choices might be anyone else’s business—
let alone a business’s business—is one that I find deeply discomfiting. I deplore efforts to limit women’s reproductive freedoms
and construe many of these as reflections of a deep-seated sexism
that no decent government should harbor or support. I have
thus written in defense of women’s rights, including their reproductive rights. 283 And other pieces of my writing evince a deep
gay or lesbian weddings. Thus, Professor Douglas Laycock would allow wedding vendors
to deny service to gays and lesbians, just so long as the wedding vendors publicized their
policies in advance. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in Douglas Laycock, Anthony R.
Picarello Jr, and Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty:
Emerging Conflicts 189, 198–99 (Rowman & Littlefield 2008). Given the way in which
the dignitary harm of a state-authorized denial of service can have ramifications for
members of all historically oppressed groups, I am skeptical that we should allow these
refusals. Their expressive implications arise not just in the face-to-face encounter in
which the gay couple is turned away (an implication that Laycock’s account avoids in
light of its publicity condition) but in the mere enjoyment of the state-sanctioned right to
discriminate. See Koppelman, Gay Rights at 645–47 (cited in note 126).
282 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591, 593–94,
619–25 (1982); Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 Tex L Rev 175,
176–81 (1982); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil & Pub Aff
204, 215–22 (1972).
283 See, for example, Amy J. Sepinwall, Defense of Others and Defenseless “Others”,
17 Yale J L & Feminism 327, 328 (2005) (arguing against the Unborn Victims of Violence
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skepticism about corporate constitutional rights. 284 My scholarly
commitments are, then, such as to propel me toward the anti–
Hobby Lobby camp. More than that, as a woman of childbearing
age who is perfectly happy with the family she has, challenges to
the contraceptive mandate strike especially close to home.
Hobby Lobby vexes me personally as much as it occupies me professionally and politically.
I offer these statements, unusual though they are in a law
review publication, to shed some light on the internal struggle
involved in advancing the thoughts contained here. Hobby
Lobby, I have contended, was rightly decided, both as a matter
of the doctrine as it stands and as a matter of the doctrine as it
should be. More generally, as I have argued, claims of conscientious objection warrant great (though not absolute) deference,
even when they do not track the understanding of complicity in
our standard legal and moral theories (as challenges to insurance subsidization do not). I arrive at these claims in spite of my
personal, ideological, and political orientation but, for all that,
with no less conviction about their truth. If I do not relish the
company of my bedfellows on these matters, I hope at least to
take refuge in the fidelity to conscience that has compelled the
reflections here.

Act of 2004 and other legislative efforts aimed at fetal protection on the ground that they
subordinate women).
284 See, for example, Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question
of Corporate Citizenship, 44 Conn L Rev 575, 581 (2012) (asserting that corporations are
not “normative citizens” and, as such, do not deserve the robust speech protections recently bestowed on them by Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US
310 (2010)).

